Over the past two days despite global attention being fixed on Iran, its war, and its negotiations statements have emerged that tether Syria into a web of strategic lightness. The first came from Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who declared that three upcoming diplomatic rounds are expected: the first in Gaza, the second in Lebanon, and the third in Syria, all aimed at expanding borders to make them “defensible.”

This coincided with remarks by Joe Kent, former director of the U.S. Counterterrorism Center, who suggested that the United States would withdraw from NATO to stand alongside Israel in the event of a future clash with Turkey in Syria.

These Israeli and American statements position Syria as an intermediary zone within an emerging framework involving multiple actors one that stands in stark contrast to the vision of Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa. In his most recent address, he stated: “We calculate our steps with utmost precision and are working to keep Syria away from any conflict.”

Al-Sharaa had, at the time, expressed relief, noting: “Syria has long been a battleground over the past 15 years and beyond, but today it is in harmony with all neighboring countries, both regionally and internationally.” Yet this moment of respite proved fleeting. Since his remarks, Syria has been pulled in multiple directions by competing regional plans, none of which allow it to achieve the “stability and security” he envisioned.

From these statements and implications emerges the following analysis an attempt to map the Israeli-American vision for Syria after its “liberation,” based on disclosed plans for regional economic, political, and security integration, as well as the pressures and scenarios unfolding behind the scenes. In these frameworks, Syria appears, at best, as a tool or a geographic space for implementation nothing more.

Syria: A Transit Space

Following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, Israel found itself facing a strategic dilemma. The expanse beyond its northern border shifted, in military and security perception, from a stable environment to a hostile one despite reassurances from the new Syrian leadership.

This prompted Israeli military leadership to exploit the political vacuum between regime collapse and consolidation of power, implementing a geographic and military shift by seizing the summit of Mount Hermon and surrounding areas.

Simultaneously, the Israeli Air Force asserted aerial dominance through more than 300 airstrikes targeting Syrian and Turkish threats, alongside over 20 ground operations by July 2025. These actions were guided by three core principles:

First, “preventing entrenchment,” through sustained strikes across Syria to limit hostile military activity, curb Turkish expansion, and reinforce diplomatic efforts aimed at eliminating Iranian presence and its supply lines.

Second, prolonging Syria’s fragmentation its so-called transitional phase transforming it into a security opportunity that keeps Syria weak, divided, and preoccupied, preventing military reconstruction or focus on key fronts, particularly the Golan and northern Syria.

Third, establishing long-term Israeli influence in Syria to prevent any centralized or regional power from consolidating within Syrian territory in ways that might threaten Israel’s strategic depth or restrict its operational freedom.

Through this approach, Israel has relied on a blend of military force, political maneuvering, and field control to manage post-Assad Syria, while intensifying coordination with the United States to prevent Turkish expansion that could trigger direct confrontation.

Within this context, a series of Israeli plans has emerged, placing Syria at the center of future strategic design—not as a sovereign actor, but as a corridor or transit space to facilitate Israeli expansion and block regional competitors.

Engineering Geography: The “David Corridor”

One such plan is the “David Corridor,” unveiled in April 2025. It envisions Israeli control extending from the Golan Heights through Quneitra and into southern Syrian provinces, alongside efforts to forge alliances with Syrian Druze communities and push for autonomy or independence.

The first phase has largely materialized: Israel now controls approximately 95% of Quneitra and maintains positions within 20 kilometers of Damascus, alongside strategic points overlooking routes connecting Damascus to Baalbek and Beirut.

The second phase remains underway, involving the manipulation of minority dynamics Druze, Kurdish, and even Alawite to establish a north-south corridor linking territories under sectarian and ethnic governance structures.

The U.S. al-Tanf base, located at the Syrian-Iraqi-Jordanian border triangle, forms a key node within this vision, enabling control over a strategic “Silk Road”-like route aligned with the concept of a “Greater Israel.” This route disrupts the Tehran–Baghdad–Damascus–Beirut axis while offering economic and security advantages.

The corridor also facilitates oil transport accounting for 18% of Syria’s GDP from Kurdish-controlled areas to Israeli ports, establishes influence along the Euphrates, and aligns with ongoing expansion toward the Litani River to secure water resources.

Beyond its economic role, the corridor functions as a forward defense line against Iranian and Turkish fronts, ensuring that any confrontation remains geographically distant from Israeli territory.

Beyond Syria: Regional Connectivity Without It

Israel’s strategic vision extends beyond reshaping Syria internally to bypassing it altogether. This includes economic corridors linking India to Europe via the Gulf and Israel, circumventing traditional trade routes through Syria and Iraq.

Energy and electricity interconnection projects across the Middle East similarly oscillate between including Syria as a transit route and replacing it with Israel, depending on shifting geopolitical calculations.

Projects such as fiber-optic networks, peace “triangles,” and green energy initiatives further highlight Syria’s marginalization relegating it to a controlled transit zone rather than an active participant.

Syria as a Security Instrument

More recently, Syria has reappeared in Israeli and American discourse not merely as a transit space but as a security instrument.

Following the Gaza ceasefire and the elevation of Hezbollah and Lebanon as Israeli priorities, Syria has been repositioned within a broader regional security architecture. It is no longer treated as a partner but as an operational domain part of air defense systems, intelligence-sharing frameworks, and early warning networks.

This was evident during the June 2025 and March 2026 wars with Iran, where Syrian airspace was used within Israel’s defensive strategy, both for interception and targeting.

On the ground, Syria’s role has shifted toward absorbing threats before they reach Israeli borders, particularly in relation to Hezbollah and other groups. U.S. envoy Tom Barrack underscored this in November 2025, stating that Syria would actively assist in dismantling remnants of ISIS, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, Hamas, Hezbollah, and other networks.

Yet Syrian leadership has expressed caution. President al-Sharaa warned that such a path constitutes a “minefield” that could trigger dangerous escalation.

Reengineering Syria

Israeli strategy, echoed by several regional allies, seeks to recast Syria into one of three forms: a structural vacuum, a geographically excluded space, or a controlled transit corridor.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has openly emphasized preventing Syria from becoming unified and strong particularly under leadership aligned with Turkey reflecting deep skepticism toward the current Syrian government.

Analysts such as Armenak Tokmajian argue that Israel is emerging as the primary architect of a new regional security order, with Syria reduced to a manageable security space.

Competing Visions

Recent developments including Turkish warnings of Israeli expansion, plans for a new Hejaz railway linking Saudi Arabia to Europe via Syria and Turkey, and internal unrest in southern Syria underscore the intensifying competition over Syria’s future.

While Damascus seeks reconstruction, legitimacy, and regional integration with Turkish and Gulf support, Israeli actions suggest that legitimacy alone will not counter expansionist strategies.

In Israeli strategic thinking, Syria is not envisioned as a cohesive state capable of recovery, but as a fluid security space reshaped, penetrated, and kept structurally weak.

Conversely, Syrian leadership aspires to rebuild the state, restore stability, and reestablish sovereignty.

Between these competing trajectories lies the central tension: a project that perpetuates Syria’s exhaustion, and another that seeks to transform it into a stable regional actor.

Perhaps what Israel ultimately fears is not merely the return of a direct threat, but the success of Syria’s recovery itself its emergence as a viable Arab model that could redirect focus toward unresolved sovereignty issues, foremost among them the Golan Heights, turning stability into a strategic concern.

Day by day, the conclusion emerging from the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran is becoming increasingly entrenched: its repercussions are no longer confined to its immediate parties. Instead, they have expanded to a broader level, reshaping the entire global geopolitical landscape.

This war has not only produced new realities on the ground but has also compelled various powers to reassess their policies toward both allies and adversaries, guided by narratives that diverge from those that prevailed before its outbreak. Europe appears to be at the forefront of regions likely to be profoundly affected by these reverberations.

In this context, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s remarks were both revealing and striking. He issued a direct warning to Europe, asserting that the continent would remain incapable of building a credible deterrent force against Russia so long as it remains captive to its traditional alliances and outdated security structures.

Any serious project aimed at establishing a European force capable of balancing Moscow, he argued, cannot be realized without Ukraine and Turkey, alongside Britain and Norway.

During his interview with Alastair Campbell on The Rest Is Politics podcast, conducted on Thursday, April 9, Zelensky was not merely seeking a new positioning for his country within Europe as part of the solution rather than a security burden. He also appeared to be pressing firmly on Europe’s long-standing open wound particularly in light of Donald Trump’s return to the White House, accompanied by a more dismissive American discourse toward European capabilities and a clearer exposure of the continent’s limited military weight and strategic autonomy.

Accordingly, Zelensky’s remarks cannot be read simply as a description of an urgent military need or an attempt to exploit the current situation to secure a foothold for his country. Rather, they represent an effort to push Europe toward reconsidering the very structure of its alliances one of the logical consequences of the ongoing war.

His statements also open the door wide to thinking about new security arrangements that transcend traditional frameworks and grant Kyiv and Ankara a central role in any future configurations not only to confront Russian pressure on the eastern front, but also to address the long-term repercussions of the American stance in terms of support, logistics, and transatlantic commitments.

An Important Context

It would be misguided to treat Zelensky’s statements in isolation from the broader context in which they were made. They coincided with an active round of international diplomacy he recently led, which included visits to several Middle Eastern countries. This movement went well beyond routine protocol, reflecting a clear Ukrainian attempt to reposition itself strategically on the map of security and influence within the European sphere and its connected regional circles.

The tour, which resulted in the signing of defense cooperation agreements with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, along with discussions of security understandings with Syria and Turkey, was not merely routine diplomacy. Rather, it appeared to be part of a broader Ukrainian effort to transform the military expertise Kyiv has accumulated over years of war into a tool of influence and partnership.

Through this trajectory, Zelensky sought to present his country not as a state merely in search of support, but as a capable actor contributing to the construction of a broader security network—one that links Europe with Turkey and the Gulf, and breaks Ukraine out of the confines of the narrow traditional Western framework.

This diplomatic activity comes at a highly significant regional and international moment shaped by the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran a conflict that, to varying degrees, has exposed the fragility of Europe’s position within Western strategic decision-making. Washington has appeared increasingly inclined to sideline European capitals, distancing them from meaningful influence over decisions of war and peace.

Amid this landscape, Zelensky’s tour and subsequent statements appear as a conscious attempt to fill an expanding vacuum. The Ukrainian president was not addressing Moscow alone as his primary concern, but Europe itself at a moment when it is grappling with eroding presence, declining influence, and shaken confidence in its capacity for independent action.

Thus, his remarks carried implications far deeper than a mere call for new alliances. They opened the door to critical questions about the future of the European bloc, the limits of its strategic autonomy, and its position on the map of influence in a world whose balances are being reshaped by wars and new alignments.

Europe’s Dilemma

The ongoing war, with the severe tests it has imposed on power balances, has revealed the extent of fragility now characterizing the European position. It has laid bare the limited actual capabilities of European states despite their heavy military and historical legacy. In the midst of this turbulent scene, Europe has appeared relatively distant from the center of action observing developments from the margins of influence rather than actively shaping them.

This impression is reinforced by Europe’s inability, thus far, to decisively conclude the confrontation with Russia in Ukraine after four years of fighting. It is also evident in its limited presence in the Middle East, where the United States continues to hold the primary levers of influence, as well as in the erosion of European influence across Africa—once one of the most prominent arenas of traditional European reach.

The issue extends beyond military or political decline to encompass an economic structure that now appears increasingly fragile and exposed to international disruptions. The Ukrainian war, followed by the Gaza war and the confrontation with Iran, has entrenched a new reality in which European economies are highly sensitive to geopolitical tensions—particularly due to disruptions in energy markets, supply chains, and mounting pressures on growth and stability.

In this context, Zelensky’s remarks resemble a strategic alarm bell directed at European capitals: any project to build a European force capable of rivaling Russia will remain incomplete unless it draws upon Ukraine’s accumulated combat and land warfare experience, Turkey’s significant military weight and geostrategic maritime position, and the strategic depth and specialized capabilities of Britain and Norway.

Thus, this message combining warning and incentive cannot be separated from a broader attempt to redraw the map of alliances within the European sphere, reassess existing partnerships, and potentially pave the way for deeper political revisions regarding the conditions that have long governed the integration of influential powers into or around Europe.

Reassessing the Map of Alliances

Since Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025, the international system has entered a state of acute political fluidity, disrupting the traditional structure of Western alliances and prompting many capitals to reconsider long-held assumptions.

This was echoed by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney during his remarks at the Davos Forum, where he spoke of the decline of the old rules-based global order in favor of a new international landscape governed by raw power considerations.

The recent war involving Iran has further intensified European concerns, particularly given Washington’s disregard for Europe in the decision to go to war, alongside an increasingly critical American tone toward European capabilities. This has affected Europe’s self-image and deepened doubts about its true position within the Western equation, leaving a heavy imprint on its political imagination and prompting a more serious reassessment of its alliance network.

Against this backdrop, Europe has already begun knocking on new doors most notably China’s. In the current moment of instability, Beijing has emerged as an economically and politically attractive destination for Washington’s allies not only in Europe but across broader regions extending from South America to Asia.

Since the beginning of this year, there has been a noticeable uptick in European engagement with China, taking on an ostensibly economic character but laden with clear diplomatic and strategic implications. This reflects a growing European effort to reevaluate its relationship with China in light of profound shifts reshaping the global order.

This trend has been embodied in a series of closely timed visits by European leaders to Beijing in the early weeks of the year, signaling a rising conviction within Europe that China is no longer merely a major trading partner, but an indispensable actor in shaping global political and economic balances and perhaps even an indirect lever in dealing with Washington.

However, Europe’s efforts to diversify partnerships and reduce dependence on the United States are unlikely to stop at China. Other powers are also poised to play a greater role within the European sphere, foremost among them Turkey, which some assessments suggest could assume a more influential role within NATO particularly in light of recurring U.S. threats to reconsider or reduce its commitment to the alliance.

Europe is also likely, out of pure pragmatism, to expand its engagement with Gulf states and influential actors in the Middle East and Africa whether to reclaim part of its declining influence or to safeguard vital interests beyond complete alignment with the American orbit.

A growing conviction appears to be taking hold within European thinking: the United States at least under the Trump administration can no longer be relied upon as the dependable ally it once was in safeguarding the Atlantic sphere or preserving Western balances.

Hence, the search for alternative pathways to enhance European autonomy and restore geopolitical momentum is gaining urgency, making the construction of new political and security partnerships a defining feature of European policy in the coming phase.

Beyond Europe’s Internal Constraints

In its effort to restore its international standing, Europe may turn to a range of mechanisms to strengthen partnerships with non-European powers such as China, Gulf states, and countries in the Middle East and Africa. These mechanisms may take multiple forms, from economic agreements and security arrangements to political coordination a path that some European capitals have already begun pursuing in recognition of the scale of transformations reshaping the international system.

Yet the more complex challenge lies not merely in expanding partnerships beyond Europe, but in integrating powers located on Europe’s periphery into the European sphere itself. This issue has long been a source of intense debate within the continent, particularly regarding Turkey and Ukraine, whose potential accession to the European Union has remained politically and strategically divisive.

In light of recent developments and the broader reassessment of European alliances, the idea of incorporating countries outside the EU’s full institutional framework such as Turkey and Ukraine—may reemerge as a viable option. This could occur alongside more closely integrated roles for Britain and Norway, positioning these arrangements as potential responses to Europe’s current phase of strategic repositioning.

However, given enduring European reservations, alternative approaches may prove more feasible. Rather than waiting for formal EU accession, Europe may move toward more flexible frameworks such as establishing a broader security alliance that includes both European and non-European states offering a parallel or alternative path to overcome the political complexities that continue to constrain both the European Union and NATO.

From this perspective, the recurring inclusion of countries outside the formal European institutional framework should not be seen merely as a theoretical expansion of partnership, but as an indication of a potential new approach one aimed at constructing a more expansive and flexible security and strategic space that transcends traditional models of European integration while responding to the pressing demands of the current geopolitical moment.

The Umayyads were thrust back into public debate following the liberation of Damascus from the Assad regime in late 2024 not as a relic of the past, but as an integral part of the Levant’s memory and identity, long marginalized and even derided by the Assad regime and its allies.

This report marks the first in a series under the file “The Umayyad Legacy,” through which Noon Post offers an in-depth reading of the Umayyad experience as the first Arab project of state-building and capital formation.

It was a pivotal moment in Islamic and global history between 661 and 750 CE, when a vast empire encompassing diverse peoples and cultures was administered from Damascus.

Rather than merely recounting events, “The Umayyad Legacy” interrogates meaning: How are capitals made? How does a place transform into a center of power? And how can historical roles be reclaimed without replicating the past?

It is a reading of history through the lens of the present, placing Damascus once again before fundamental questions of statehood, urban identity, and collective memory.

In the summer of 634 CE, Damascus opened its gates to a new political reality, closing the chapter of Byzantine rule and ushering in a new era in the history of the Levant. Yet this transformation did not fully take root until two years later, when the Battle of Yarmouk decisively shifted the balance of power, cementing Islamic rule and inaugurating a new historical phase for the region.

The city was first governed by Yazid ibn Abi Sufyan. Following his death in 639 CE, his brother Muawiya succeeded him. From the city’s alleys and walls, a new center of gravity began to take shape more structured governance and a Levant increasingly unified under a single leadership.

From Damascus, the foundations of a stable political authority emerged, providing Muawiya with the base from which he would later ascend to the caliphate.

In 661 CE (41 AH), after Hasan ibn Ali abdicated power, Muawiya entered Kufa and declared the “Year of Unity.” The Islamic provinces were consolidated under his authority, marking the beginning of the Umayyad state. With the transfer of the caliphate’s seat to Damascus, the city was transformed from a regional hub into a major political capital.

From there, the Umayyads governed a state that stretched from the borders of China in the east to the Atlantic Ocean in the west, encompassing peoples, religions, and languages never before unified under a single center. Within a single century, they built an empire that surpassed the Roman Empire in territorial extent. The Umayyad era was thus central to shaping both Islamic and world history.

More than thirteen centuries later, Syrians revived this legacy, bringing it back into focus with the liberation of Damascus in December 2024. The moment carried profound symbolic weight it was not merely the fall of the Assad regime, but a reopening of questions surrounding identity and memory, invoking the Umayyad legacy as a living reservoir of dignity and pride.

Damascus and the Invention of the Center: A Capital Governing Three Continents

Damascus was no ordinary city in the ancient world. Its location along the land bridge between Asia and Africa, and its connection to the Mediterranean basin, granted it a central role in overland trade networks. It became a key station for caravans traveling between the Arabian Peninsula, the Levant, Egypt, and Mesopotamia.

From this strategic position, the city acquired both economic weight and military significance. It passed through the hands of successive great empires from the Assyrians and Babylonians to the Persians, and later the Romans and Byzantines.

Despite its demographic and economic prosperity under Roman and Byzantine rule, Damascus remained a regional administrative center within a broader imperial system, while ultimate political authority resided in Rome and later Constantinople.

This reality changed fundamentally in 661 CE with the establishment of the Umayyad state and the designation of Damascus as the capital of the caliphate. The decision was not merely administrative but foundational and deliberate, grounded in the city’s relative security, proximity to the Byzantine frontier, administrative experience, and trade networks.

From that point onward, Damascus became a political and administrative center leading a vast state, and an early model of an Arab capital managing significant human and cultural diversity.

The centralization that emerged during the Umayyad period was not created from scratch. It extended a trajectory that began under Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab, who laid the institutional foundations of governance through provincial divisions, the appointment of governors, the regulation of taxation, the establishment of administrative registers (diwans), and the principle of accountability before the caliph.

Following the declaration of Damascus as the capital, Muawiya ibn Abi Sufyan further developed and consolidated this framework. The caliphate became firmly established as the apex of political, military, and religious authority. The state was divided into provinces governed by appointed emirs responsible for tax collection, remittance to the treasury (Bayt al-Mal), maintaining security, defending borders, managing troops, and supporting expansion.

These governors did not command large independent armies; rather, they relied on social standing, influence over tribal dynamics, and the ability to navigate inter-tribal divisions.

The Umayyad caliph stood at the head of the state as supreme leader, commander-in-chief, and religious and judicial authority. He directly appointed governors, judges, and military commanders, all accountable to him. In major cities such as Kufa, Basra, and Fustat, responsibilities were distributed among the governor, the tax administrator, the judge, and the chief of police.

Syria and Upper Mesopotamia fell under the caliph’s direct authority, while other provinces included Egypt; Iraq, with its centers in Kufa and Basra; Persia and Khurasan; Armenia and Azerbaijan; Bahrain and Oman; the Hijaz and Yemen, among others. At times, multiple regions were placed under a single governor.

Yet the vast geographic scope and diverse political and military conditions particularly in North Africa posed unique challenges. The distance and complexity of tribal and military dynamics necessitated administrative restructuring.

Ifriqiya, once governed from Egypt, became an independent province in 705 CE and was further divided into administrative units such as Ifriqiya, Tripoli, al-Zab, and al-Sus, each overseen by deputies with authority over smaller districts.

At the same time, new urban centers with military and administrative functions were established, including Kairouan in Ifriqiya, Wasit in Iraq, and Ramla in Palestine, alongside the preservation and development of existing administrative infrastructures.

Thus, the state expanded rapidly: eastward through Persia and Khurasan into Transoxiana and Sindh; northward to Armenia and the Caucasus; westward to Ifriqiya and then al-Andalus in 711 CE. The Red Sea became a vital commercial artery linking Egypt to the Arabian Peninsula, East Africa, and South Asia, while campaigns against Constantinople marked the peak of confrontation with Byzantium in the early eighth century.

By 750 CE, the Umayyad state had reached its maximum extent from al-Andalus in the west to the borders of Central Asia in the east, from the Caucasus in the north to deep Africa in the south. Damascus remained at the heart of this expanse, transformed from a crossroads of trade into an imperial capital that established the first Arab model for governing vast, diverse territories.

Institutions of Umayyad Rule: How Was a Vast Empire Governed from Damascus?

Administration and Communications

Muawiya ibn Abi Sufyan expanded administrative frameworks by establishing the Diwan al-Rasa’il (Chancellery), responsible for correspondence between the caliph and his governors and commanders. Its head was chosen from the caliph’s inner circle due to the sensitive nature of the information handled. Over time, the diwan evolved into a full-fledged institution with specialized scribes, archival systems, and document preservation.

To ensure document authenticity and prevent forgery, Muawiya established the Diwan al-Khatam (Seal Office), which stamped official correspondence with an engraved seal. As the empire expanded, the need for rapid communication led to the creation of the Diwan al-Barid (Postal Service), a network of relay stations equipped with horses and couriers to transmit messages, directives, and even personnel.

Under Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan, the postal system was further enhanced, becoming an integrated infrastructure that combined administrative coordination with oversight of provincial conditions solidifying Damascus as a powerful administrative hub.

Law and Judiciary

In the early Islamic period, caliphs personally adjudicated disputes. Umar ibn al-Khattab institutionalized this function by appointing specialized judges across provinces.

As the Umayyad state expanded and Arab and non-Arab populations mixed, the need for further organization grew. Judges such as Sulaym ibn Anaz in Egypt began documenting judicial rulings. Under Abd al-Malik, the Mazalim courts were established to handle complex cases, particularly those involving elites.

Judicial administration developed gradually, with judges appointed by caliphs and governors and held accountable to them. The state also issued judicial decrees to standardize procedures.

The Umayyads also established the Hisba system to oversee public order and prevent violations in markets and public spaces. Market inspectors (muhtasibs) monitored weights, measures, roads, and public infrastructure.

In jurisprudence, independent reasoning (ijtihad) flourished before the crystallization of the four Sunni schools. Prominent scholars included Abd al-Rahman al-Awza‘i, while Abu Hanifa and Malik ibn Anas later founders of major legal schools emerged toward the end of the Umayyad era.

Security and the Military

Military organization began under Umar ibn al-Khattab with the establishment of the Diwan al-Jund in 641 CE. As the Umayyad state expanded, Muawiya introduced specialized security institutions: the hajib (chamberlain), the royal guard, and the police.

Initially linked to the judiciary, the police gradually became an independent institution responsible for criminal investigation and enforcement. Notable figures included Nusair, father of Musa ibn Nusair, the conqueror of al-Andalus.

The Umayyads also strengthened the army, initially recruiting Arabs, then incorporating Berbers following expansions into North Africa and al-Andalus. Military centralization increased during the Marwanid period, reducing tribal dependence and creating a more cohesive and mobile force.

Naval power was also developed, with Muawiya credited for establishing the first Islamic fleet, capturing Mediterranean islands such as Arwad and Rhodes, and fortifying coastal cities like Acre and Tyre. Maritime activity extended into the Red Sea, enhancing trade and pilgrimage routes.

Revenue and Finance

Financial administration began under Umar ibn al-Khattab with the creation of the Diwan al-Kharaj, drawing on Persian administrative models. It oversaw taxation, revenues, and military salaries, with each province operating in its administrative language.

Under Muawiya, this system expanded, becoming the backbone of state financing, including revenues from zakat, jizya, and kharaj.

The most significant transformation came under Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan, whose reforms included restructuring taxation, restricting military salaries to active soldiers, minting an independent Islamic currency, and Arabizing administrative registers.

Taxation was broadened to include all landowners, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. Population surveys conducted in Syria (697–698 CE), and in al-Jazira and Egypt (706–711 CE), ensured efficient revenue collection. Provincial tax officials reported directly to Damascus.

Public spending included irrigation projects along the Tigris and Euphrates, agricultural development, and provisions for prisoners and war captives.

The Umayyad experience demonstrates that what made Damascus an exceptional imperial capital was not only its symbolism and geography, but its ability to govern from a clear center of decision-making, connect distant peripheries, and build effective institutions.

The lesson history offers Syria today is clear: restoring political and cultural influence begins with constructing a well-defined central authority capable of forging a unifying identity, while maintaining administrative flexibility to manage social and cultural diversity.

Revitalizing markets, strengthening trade infrastructure, and reactivating regional and international networks can restore Damascus not merely as a crossroads between East and West, but as a civilizational and political heart of the region.

In a country exhausted by war and fractured by political divisions, the legal system has not been spared this fragmentation. On the contrary, it has been among the sectors most deeply affected, as overlapping security, political, and economic factors have undermined the performance of justice institutions, weakening their ability to uphold the rule of law and protect rights.

The Ministry of Legal Affairs stands out as one of the key bodies tasked with reassessing the legislative framework reviewing existing laws and updating them to keep pace with rapid transformations, whether in the evolution of crime patterns or the social and economic changes imposed by years of conflict.

Between the need for structural reform, the pressures of reality, and limited resources, a central question persists: can trust in the law be rebuilt as a unifying umbrella?

In this interview with Yemen’s Minister of Legal Affairs, Judge Ishraq Fadl Abdullah Al-Maqtari, we explore a range of issues related to the current state of the legal system, the challenges of administering justice, as well as corruption, transitional justice, women’s rights, and the role of law in supporting paths toward stability.

Al-Maqtari is a well-known legal figure with extensive experience in the judiciary and human rights, having participated in several missions related to investigating violations and legal work at both the national and international levels, alongside a strong interest in justice and women’s rights.

In the following lines, the minister part of the government formed in February 2026 outlines her vision on these issues, reviewing existing challenges, priorities, and the limits of possible reform under current conditions.

Minister, how do you assess the current state of Yemen’s legal system amid political division and multiple authorities?

Frankly, Yemen’s legal system is in urgent need of modernization and development. The current situation cannot be separated from political fragmentation and the multiplicity of authorities. However, regarding the legislative branch, it remains unified in the parliament, most of whose members are based in areas under the internationally recognized government or aligned with it.

That said, the real challenge lies in the fact that many laws have become outdated and worn out, no longer aligned with current realities. This necessitates their urgent review and amendment, in addition to the need for new legislation that keeps pace with evolving crime patterns and changing economic and social conditions, and their impact on rights.

What are the Ministry of Legal Affairs’ priorities at this sensitive stage?

At this stage, the ministry has prioritized reviewing outdated and inadequate legislation and working to modernize it. We are also focused on drafting new laws that have become urgently necessary, particularly those addressing crimes that affect fundamental rights, including the right to life. Additionally, we are working on laws related to investment and private sector empowerment to support economic growth.

We have already launched a work program for 2026 aimed at identifying weaknesses in legislation through the formation of specialized legal teams.

Can we speak of the rule of law in Yemen today? What conditions are necessary to achieve it?

Yes, we can speak of the rule of law as long as there are clear national objectives within the government’s program, grounded in governance principles where all state institutions operate according to the law. The rule of law is achieved when decisions, contracts, and procedures are issued within clear legal frameworks, and when law enforcement and judicial bodies adhere strictly to the law without overreach. The presence of a government and a Presidential Leadership Council committed to this approach strengthens the prospects of achieving it.

What challenges currently face the implementation of justice?

The challenges are significant and multifaceted. Foremost among them is the security challenge, particularly the existence of armed groups operating outside state authority. There is also the issue of outdated laws that no longer keep pace with reality.

Moreover, there is an urgent need to train security and judicial personnel to align with international developments, especially in defining crimes and violations and how to handle them. Modern crimes particularly cybercrime pose a major challenge due to the absence of adequate legislation and technical tools. It must also be noted that the continuation of war across many governorates remains a major obstacle to the implementation of justice.

How does the ministry deal with human rights violations, especially in light of repeated international reports?

The ministry is not the primary body responsible for this file, but it plays an important legal role by working on national legislation that criminalizes such violations, prevents impunity, and guarantees victims’ rights.

There is also a renewed focus on revisiting the draft transitional justice law, which has been under discussion since 2013. We are currently reviewing it and listening to the views of civil society, victims, and organizations.

Are there concrete steps toward achieving transitional justice, or is this file still postponed?

The file is no longer entirely postponed. There is a clear direction to reintroduce and seriously examine it, especially in light of the push toward peace. Achieving comprehensive peace requires a legal framework that guarantees victims’ rights, making transitional justice a fundamental component of any peace process.

Which laws are you currently working to amend or introduce?

We are working on amending the Crimes and Penalties Law, given the emergence of new crimes that did not previously exist, such as cybercrime and racism. Current penalties are no longer sufficiently deterrent, and there are contradictions in some provisions. These amendments aim to keep pace with social developments and better protect rights.

To what extent do Yemeni laws keep pace with political and social transformations?

Current legislation does not adequately keep pace with these transformations, especially given the profound changes in social relations and the spread of social media. There is an urgent need to update laws to regulate these relationships and protect rights amid this social, economic, and intellectual diversity.

Is there a clear plan for judicial reform, or do current challenges hinder it?

Judicial reform begins with legislative reform, but that alone is insufficient. There is a need to train judges and update their knowledge, particularly in handling modern cases. Security challenges also hinder the judiciary’s work, in addition to the need to develop curricula at the Judicial Institute.

What role does your ministry play in combating corruption? Do you have effective legal tools?

The ministry plays an important legal and oversight role by ensuring the integrity of legal procedures within state institutions. We have already begun correcting some mechanisms, particularly those related to legal opinions, legislation, and decisions on appointments and promotions.

How do you respond to criticism that the legal system is sometimes used as a cover to justify corruption?

The problem does not lie in legal texts themselves, but in weak implementation and the absence of oversight in previous periods, which allowed corruption to spread. Procedural legal systems were not properly activated, particularly within oversight institutions.

Have any major corruption cases been recently pursued? What are the results so far?

This file is primarily handled by oversight bodies such as the Central Organization for Control and Auditing. I do not have precise details regarding major cases recently pursued.

To what extent does your ministry enjoy independence from the executive branch?

The ministry enjoys relative independence through its own laws and internal regulations, but it ultimately operates within an integrated government framework, requiring coordination with other ministries to achieve broader goals.

Do you face political pressure when dealing with sensitive issues? How can balance be achieved?

Political reality naturally imposes challenges and pressures, but balance can be achieved through adherence to the law, institutional work, and cooperation among various government bodies.

How do you assess the status of women within Yemen’s legal system?

There is a clear need for fundamental reforms, particularly in personal status and criminal laws. Despite the presence of some positive provisions, practical application still reflects discrimination due to the absence of clear strategies to address these issues.

Do current laws do justice to women, or are fundamental reforms needed?

Fundamental reforms are needed to ensure justice for women, both in legal texts and in their application.

What is your stance on issues such as child marriage and domestic violence?

Child marriage constitutes a serious violation of rights and must be criminalized through clear legal provisions that set a minimum age for marriage. Domestic violence, in all its forms, must also be explicitly criminalized due to its severe impact on women and society.

How has the war affected the structure of Yemen’s legal system?

The war has significantly impacted legal institutions, including the judiciary, prosecution, and security agencies, weakening their ability to perform their duties and halting modernization and development efforts.

Is there legal coordination among different parties, or does each region operate under a separate system?

There is coordination within state institutions in areas under government control, but political division limits the existence of a unified legal system nationwide.

What is the role of law in paving the way toward peace?

Law plays a central role in building peace by guaranteeing rights and establishing a legal framework for any peace agreement, thereby achieving justice and stability.

What challenges have you personally faced in this position?

The most prominent challenges are limited resources—both financial and human—alongside the heavy workload compared to available capacities, in addition to political and security challenges.

What have you not yet been able to achieve, and why?

We are still in the institutional-building phase and have not yet achieved our full ambitions due to limited resources and the complexity of the overall situation.

Do you feel you have the real ability to effect change, or does political reality impose constraints?

Change is possible, but it requires collective effort and cooperation among various state institutions, despite the challenges and pressures.

What message would you like to convey to Yemeni citizens who have lost faith in justice?

We understand the loss of trust, but there are genuine efforts underway to rebuild it. This will take time, along with societal cooperation to raise awareness and support reforms.

In Iran’s political landscape, public-facing figures often take center stage, while the real balance of power is managed behind the scenes. Names such as Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf in negotiations, Mojtaba Khamenei within religious power circles, and Masoud Pezeshkian in the presidency recur in public discourse. Yet the true center of gravity lies elsewhere where Ahmad Vahidi stands as the holder of real power.

On March 1, 2026, Vahidi assumed command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) following the assassination of his predecessor, Mohammad Bagheri, in joint U.S.-Israeli strikes. His appointment came under intense pressure, reflecting the nature of the phase Iran is navigating, where leadership shifts under the weight of targeted attacks and decision-making centers are rapidly reengineered to match the tempo of confrontation.

Vahidi was no newcomer to this role. He has long been regarded as one of the principal architects of Iran’s extraterritorial presence and a deeply rooted figure within the IRGC’s structure. His decades-long involvement in the most sensitive files granted him a prominent position within the decision-making apparatus even before stepping into the spotlight.

The Son of Shiraz Who Chose the Rifle

Ahmad Vahidi was born in 1958 in Shiraz under the name “Vahid Shah Cheraghi,” in a city steeped in cultural heritage and regarded as a cornerstone of Persian identity. Within this geography of poetry and history, a personality took shape that gravitated early toward security and militarization reflecting the broader transformations Iran was undergoing at the time.

His youth coincided with the political upheavals of the 1970s, culminating in the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which marked the true beginning of his career. He joined the IRGC at its inception, becoming part of a generation that helped build the institution and define its early contours.

During the Iran-Iraq War, Vahidi accumulated early field experience and quickly became associated with intelligence and organizational work within the IRGC. In 1981, following Mohsen Rezaei’s appointment as commander, Vahidi became deputy head of the intelligence unit, contributing to its structure and the development of its operational tools, alongside helping establish training camps.

Parallel to his military career, Vahidi pursued academic studies, earning degrees in electronics and industrial engineering, and later a PhD in strategic studies from Imam Sadiq University. He eventually served as president of the National Defense University—a trajectory reflecting a comprehensive approach to warfare that integrates technical, planning, and strategic dimensions.

Over four decades, Vahidi moved through pivotal positions within the state structure, including leading the Quds Force in its formative phase, serving as deputy defense minister for planning and programs, minister of defense, a member of the Expediency Discernment Council, minister of interior under President Ebrahim Raisi, and later deputy commander-in-chief of the IRGC.

These transitions reflect a distinct pattern of power-building in Iran one rooted in long-term accumulation within the security establishment and sustained presence at decision-making junctions. Vahidi exemplifies a generation shaped by war and refined through intelligence and strategic work, resulting in an approach centered on safeguarding the regime’s structure and strengthening its tools against external pressures.

Even the alteration of his surname from “Shah Cheraghi” to “Vahidi” encapsulates this trajectory, signaling a more austere and focused identity. He is widely regarded as a hardline figure deeply embedded within the IRGC, driven by a firm belief in the role of force in protecting the revolution and managing a prolonged confrontation with external pressures.

The Man Who Forged Iran’s Real Weapon

The defining question of Iran’s trajectory over recent decades revolves around its ability to expand regional influence despite economic and military constraints. From Lebanon to Yemen, and from Iraq to Syria, this influence has been anchored in a single instrument: the Quds Force. The early architecture of this tool leads directly to Ahmad Vahidi.

Established in 1988 as part of a restructuring of the IRGC after the Iran-Iraq War, the Quds Force was tasked with external operations. From its inception, Vahidi led the unit, transforming an emerging organizational structure into an apparatus guided by a clear doctrine, expansive networks, and integrated mechanisms combining intelligence and military operations.

Under his leadership, a model emerged based on managing conflict across multiple arenas through local actors tied to Tehran via organizational and ideological links. This approach allowed Iran to exert influence without direct military engagement, enabling the construction of a geographically and functionally distributed network.

Within this framework, the Quds Force became the primary support instrument for regional allies, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Palestinian factions, the Houthi movement in Yemen, and armed networks in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.

Its operations relied on training, expertise exchange, and capacity-building blending intelligence work with indirect warfare management.

Lebanon served as the model’s primary launching point following Israel’s 1982 invasion, where the Quds Force played a key role in organizing and developing Hezbollah into a comprehensive military, political, and social actor. The model was later adapted to other arenas, tailored to the specific dynamics of each environment.

In the 1990s, the force expanded eastward, supporting the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan against the Taliban and engaging with Kurdish forces in the context of conflict with Saddam Hussein’s regime. This expansion from West Asia to its eastern reaches demonstrated an ability to manage complex networks combining military support with political ties.

Vahidi’s leadership laid the groundwork later expanded by Qassem Soleimani, reflecting institutional continuity. The foundational rules of engagement were established during the formative phase before evolving into more complex forms in subsequent years.

In recent years, this system has faced mounting challenges, as Iran’s allies have come under increasing military and security pressure across multiple arenas, alongside political shifts affecting regional balances including developments in Syria and the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in late 2024. These changes have raised questions about the network’s adaptability, particularly following the decline of the Quds Force’s role after Soleimani’s assassination.

In this context, Vahidi’s rise to lead the IRGC carries particular significance. As one of the chief architects of this structure, his presence at the helm signals the prominence of a security-operational approach and underscores Iran’s continued reliance on both direct and indirect tools in managing its regional conflicts.

An IRGC Commander Wanted Internationally

Ahmad Vahidi occupies a position that combines the apex of Iran’s security power with ongoing entanglement in international legal cases. His career from leading the Quds Force to serving as defense and interior minister, and ultimately heading the IRGC—has been accompanied by legal pursuits and multiple sanctions, making him one of the most controversial figures within Iran’s system.

The most prominent case relates to the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires, which targeted a Jewish community center, killing 85 people and injuring hundreds. Argentine investigations linked the attack to a complex network of planning and support, placing Vahidi among those suspected of involvement in decision-making. In 2006, an arrest warrant was issued, followed by Interpol notices, with Argentina continuing to call for his detention.

The case remains open and resurfaced in 2024 when Argentina’s highest criminal court ruled that Iran and Hezbollah were responsible for the bombing, describing it as a politically and strategically motivated act. This ruling reaffirmed Vahidi’s position among those associated with the case, alongside other senior Iranian officials.

One of the most complex chapters of this case concerns the assassination of prosecutor Alberto Nisman, who was killed in 2015 after accusing Argentine officials of covering up Iran’s role. The incident cast a long shadow over the case, further intensifying controversy without reaching a definitive resolution.

Separately, Vahidi has been subject to multiple international sanctions. The European Union listed him in connection with sensitive nuclear activities, while the United States imposed sanctions related to his role in handling domestic protests, particularly those of 2022.

Despite this, he has maintained an uninterrupted presence within state institutions, benefiting from the legal and political dynamics governing Iran’s relationship with the international system. Restrictions have largely remained external, while domestically he has continued to rise to more influential positions.

His name has also been linked to episodes reflecting another dimension of his work, including involvement in covert contacts during the 1980s as part of the Iran-Contra affair, which saw undisclosed communication between Tehran and elements within Ronald Reagan’s administration revealing a pragmatic pattern that combines rigid political rhetoric with quiet backchannel dealings.

The Unseen Man of War

Three commanders have led the IRGC in less than a year amid unprecedented escalation. The assassination of two successive leaders paved the way for Ahmad Vahidi’s ascent to the top of the institution at one of its most sensitive moments since its founding.

On December 31, 2025, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Vahidi as deputy commander-in-chief of the IRGC, succeeding Ali Fadavi, in a move reflecting efforts to reorganize leadership ahead of a potentially escalatory phase. He was tasked with enhancing military readiness amid expectations of direct confrontation with the United States and Israel.

Weeks later, war erupted on February 28, 2026, when a strike targeted a meeting of senior commanders, including Mohammad Bagheri, who was killed. Vahidi, absent from the meeting, assumed command immediately upon confirmation of the assassination a swift transition reflecting wartime institutional management.

His rise was not incidental but built on his prior role in preparing the institution for confrontation, his extensive intelligence background, and his role in founding the Quds Force positioning him to manage the intersection between military fronts and regional extensions.

Within this broader power structure, decision-making increasingly centers on figures with IRGC backgrounds, including Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and Mojtaba Khamenei, reflecting a distribution of roles across politics, religion, and security. Within this equation, Vahidi retains authority over the management and direction of force, with direct influence on military operations and escalation choices.

His public discourse reflects a vision of the IRGC as a central pillar of the state, capable of extending beyond military functions into broader governance. This helps explain the institution’s growing presence in decision-making, particularly during periods of conflict.

Ultimately, Vahidi emerges as a leader who operates away from the spotlight, shaping events from within the institution. His presence at the apex of Iran’s security hierarchy increasingly positions him as the arbiter of escalation and de-escalation signaling a shift toward a military-security approach as the dominant center of gravity within the Islamic Republic, where political decisions are tightly intertwined with their execution on the ground in a moment defined by war and the reshaping of regional power balances.

Before the U.S.–Israeli war on Iran, the issue of Iran’s stranded funds was largely confined to the narrow channels of sanctions policy and limited diplomatic bargaining. That changed when Pakistan stepped in to mediate negotiations aimed at halting the fighting.

During talks held in Islamabad, an Iranian source told Reuters that Washington had agreed to release frozen Iranian funds. A U.S. official, however, swiftly denied the claim.

The renewed discussion of these funds raises a central question: what exactly are these assets, where are they held, and how do frozen funds differ from restricted accounts and the broader financial flows linked to Iran through commercial networks? This report seeks to map out these balances, categorize them, and explain why they have returned to the negotiating table after the war.

Mapping Iran’s Overseas Assets

1. Frozen Accounts in Qatar

Among the most widely known Iranian assets are $6 billion in oil revenues that were once frozen in South Korea before being transferred to restricted accounts in Qatar in September 2023 as part of a prisoner exchange deal between Washington and Tehran.

Official U.S. documents confirm that the transfer from South Korean banks to Qatari accounts was conditional on the funds being used exclusively for humanitarian trade. The money is not paid directly to Iran; instead, it is disbursed to suppliers under U.S. Treasury supervision.

Following Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack on Israel, the administration of former President Joe Biden suspended access to these funds, effectively re-freezing them while keeping them under monitoring and limiting their use strictly to humanitarian purposes.

In April 2026, an Iranian source told Reuters that releasing these funds was a condition for ensuring safe passage for ships through the Strait of Hormuz. The United States denied that any such agreement had been reached.

2. Accumulated Funds in Iraq and Oman

Iraq imports electricity and gas from Iran, but sanctions have complicated payment transfers. Over the years, these dues have accumulated to an estimated $10 billion.

In 2023 and 2024, the United States allowed Baghdad to deposit these payments into restricted bank accounts inside Iraq, as well as in third-party jurisdictions such as Oman.

U.S. Treasury officials clarified that these funds may only be used to purchase humanitarian goods such as food and medicine. The arrangement aims to ease Tehran’s financial pressure on Baghdad without granting Iran access to unrestricted liquidity.

During a U.S. congressional session in April 2024, Representative Gregory Meeks confirmed that these funds are “held in escrow accounts,” noting that a small portion had been transferred to an account in Oman under U.S. oversight, accessible only for humanitarian purchases.

3. Financial Networks in the UAE

Beyond official reserves, tens of billions of dollars linked to Iran circulate across Gulf markets through front companies, exchange houses, and commercial intermediaries. Dubai, particularly the Dubai Multi Commodities Centre free zone, has emerged as a central hub for these flows.

A U.S. Treasury report from October 2025 revealed that approximately $8.6 billion in Iran-linked financial flows passed through the UAE and other financial centers in 2024. More than 70 percent of these transactions involved UAE-based entities, most of them in Dubai.

The report indicates that these flows include oil revenues channeled through front companies, shipping firms, and investment vehicles. Independent estimates place the total value of Iran-linked assets in the UAE at around $50 billion.

These funds are not sovereign frozen assets but rather complex financial networks deeply intertwined with the local economy. This has revived debate over whether freezing them would harm Dubai’s reputation as a financial hub more than it would impact Iran.

4. Assets in Tokyo and Seoul

Iranian officials have also pointed in recent years to frozen assets in South Korea, Japan, and other countries.

In South Korea, Iran long cited roughly $7 billion in oil revenues frozen under U.S. sanctions. The most prominent portion—$6 billion—was transferred in 2023 to restricted accounts in Qatar under the prisoner exchange deal.

Japan’s case has been more ambiguous. Reuters estimated Iran’s frozen funds there at about $1.5 billion in early 2021, later citing Iranian officials who suggested a higher figure of up to $3 billion.

In August 2023, then-Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi called on Japan to release $1.5 billion in frozen funds, before later stating that the only frozen assets were in South Korea.

Types of Iranian Funds Abroad

1. Frozen Assets

According to the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), “freezing” or “blocking” assets means imposing an immediate prohibition on their transfer or use.

Ownership remains with the original holder, but the assets cannot be accessed or moved without OFAC authorization. This applies to Iranian funds in Qatar after they were re-frozen: the accounts exist, but Iran cannot withdraw or transfer the money.

2. Restricted Funds

Restricted funds are held in accounts that can be used only for specific purchases under humanitarian or limited trade exemptions such as the Qatar humanitarian channel.

OFAC guidance explains that the channel is designed to enable the Iranian public to access food, medicine, and medical equipment through tightly monitored payments. It does not permit funds to be transferred to the Iranian government or companies, nor does it lift any sanctions.

Similarly, accounts managed by Iraq and Oman are limited to financing “non-sanctionable activities” such as food and medicine purchases. Each transaction requires approval from the U.S. Treasury. These funds are considered restricted not frozen because they remain usable under strict conditions.

3. Financial Flows and Networks

In parallel with official reserves, Iran has developed over decades of sanctions a shadow system to convert oil revenues into cash.

A U.S. Treasury report showed that these networks include front companies in the UAE, Hong Kong, and Singapore, using correspondent accounts in U.S. banks to transfer roughly $9 billion in 2024.

These flows are neither “frozen” nor “restricted” assets. They are commercial holdings owned by private entities, often registered under foreign nationals. As a result, freezing them is far more complex and requires proof that sanctioned individuals ultimately control them.

Why Has the Issue Resurfaced Now?

The U.S.–Israeli war on Iran led to intermittent closures of the Strait of Hormuz and drove oil prices to unprecedented levels.

While Tehran benefited from higher oil revenues, the war also strained its economy due to strikes on oil infrastructure and intensified sanctions.

In this context, Iran has turned to its stranded funds as a means of easing domestic economic pressure and financing reconstruction efforts.

Recent protests inside Iran demanding relief from inflation and improved access to basic goods have further heightened the need for dollar liquidity, making the release of assets a government priority.

Tehran has linked the release of funds to guarantees of safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz, signaling the use of a geopolitical lever: the ability to disrupt global shipping and inflict economic damage on Gulf states if its demands are not met.

Leaked details from the Pakistan-mediated talks suggest that freedom of navigation in Hormuz was a central issue. In other words, stranded funds have become part of a broader bargaining framework encompassing maritime security, regional stability, sanctions relief, and even compensation for war damages.

For its part, the United States has rejected these demands, insisting that any release of funds must remain within “humanitarian channels,” further complicating prospects for a deal especially as Iran seeks relief on three fronts: frozen and restricted assets, economic sanctions, and war reparations.

The professional networking platform LinkedIn has returned to the spotlight following the publication of a new investigative report accusing the company of facilitating user surveillance and transferring data to third parties, specifically in the United States and Israel.

The investigation gains added significance in light of the platform’s record on moderating Palestinian content and its perceived bias toward Israel. What exactly has this latest development revealed, and how extensive is Tel Aviv’s influence within the company?

What Did the New Investigation Reveal?

An investigation titled “BrowserGate,” published by the German association Fairlinked, revealed that LinkedIn had been deploying a small piece of code within users’ browsers to check whether specific extensions were installed.

According to the report, the practice went beyond merely identifying these extensions. It also involved collecting technical data about users’ devices, with indications that part of this process is linked to the U.S.-based company HUMAN Security, which previously merged with the Israeli firm PerimeterX.

As explained by independent tech outlets, the mechanism itself was technically straightforward: the code attempts to access a small, known file within each browser extension. If successful, the platform can confirm that the extension is installed on the user’s device.

In simpler terms, LinkedIn was verifying the presence of extensions allowing it to determine whether users were employing tools that might compete with its services or extract data from its platform.

Tests conducted by BleepingComputer found that LinkedIn was scanning more than 6,236 extensions using this method. These included widely known tools such as Apollo, Lusha, and ZoomInfo, as well as others not directly tied to LinkedIn’s sales ecosystem, including grammar-checking tools and job-search extensions.

The investigation further showed that the code was not limited to scanning extensions. It also gathered general technical information about devices, including language settings, time zone, screen resolution, available memory, CPU core count, battery status, and certain audio and storage characteristics. While this data does not directly reveal a user’s identity, it can be used to construct a unique “device fingerprint” that distinguishes and profiles the device.

Notably, this scanning did not begin recently but expanded gradually over several years. According to The Next Web, LinkedIn initially scanned just 38 extensions in 2017. This number rose to 461 in 2024 and reached 6,167 extensions by February 2026.

Subsequent tests by BleepingComputer in early April confirmed that the number had climbed to 6,236. This indicates that the issue is not an isolated or temporary technical measure, but rather part of a steadily expanding trajectory.

LinkedIn responded by stating that it scans certain extensions as part of efforts to protect the platform from tools that scrape data in violation of its policies and to ensure site stability.

The company also emphasized that it does not use this data to infer sensitive information about its members. However, it did not provide detailed explanations regarding how the data is stored, how long it is retained, or the precise limits of its use leaving the controversy unresolved.

A Record of Digital Bias Against Palestinians

1. Suppression of Palestinian Content

Years before this investigation emerged, LinkedIn had already faced accusations of bias in its moderation of Palestinian content, most notably for removing posts related to Palestine, including the phrase “from the river to the sea.”

On October 27, 2025, 7amleh – The Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media published a report based on 15 testimonies from users and employees within Microsoft and LinkedIn. The report documented cases of posts supporting Palestinian rights being removed or restricted, alongside leniency toward content inciting violations against Palestinians.

It further alleged that senior management was making decisions that bypassed standard procedures, resulting in what it described as “dual censorship” restricting Palestinian voices while permitting hate speech.

The report also referenced internal complaints filed since October 2023 regarding these double standards, noting that many users had begun practicing self-censorship out of fear of losing employment opportunities.

2. Classification of Palestinian Cities

On January 5, 2026, 7amleh sent an open letter to LinkedIn’s CEO expressing concern over the platform’s classification of certain Palestinian cities such as Bethlehem and Ramallah under the label “Judea and Samaria, Israel.”

The letter argued that this designation distorts geographic reality and contributes to the digital normalization of annexation. It further asserted that the practice violates international standards, which recognize the West Bank as occupied territory.

The organization stressed that naming conventions are not neutral, and that the use of biblical terminology reinforces a settler narrative while undermining Palestinians’ digital rights. LinkedIn did not respond to the letter.

How Strong Are LinkedIn’s Ties to Israel?

LinkedIn is a U.S.-based company headquartered in California. It was acquired by Microsoft in 2016 in a $26.2 billion all-cash deal, while retaining its brand and operational independence. Nevertheless, the company maintains a tangible operational presence in Israel.

On February 28, 2022, LinkedIn announced an agreement to acquire the marketing analytics startup Oribi, confirming that it would open a new office in Tel Aviv as part of the deal.

According to the company’s official blog, the office would serve as an innovation hub, with Oribi’s team including founder Iris Shoor joining LinkedIn in Tel Aviv.

A TechCrunch report estimated the deal’s value at between $80 million and $90 million, noting that it marked LinkedIn’s first official presence in Israel.

In June 2023, the Israeli newspaper Globes reported that LinkedIn had leased an entire 1,400-square-meter floor in the Alon B Tower in Tel Aviv, employing around 50 staff members in Israel.

This expansion suggests that the company’s operational footprint extends beyond merely integrating the Oribi team, evolving instead into a regional hub for development and marketing.

Meanwhile, HUMAN Security headquartered in the United States with operational centers in Tel Aviv has effectively become a U.S.-Israeli company following its merger with the Israeli firm PerimeterX.

Data from IVC indicates that a research and development center in Israel was established after the merger. The Hebrew-language newspaper Calcalist reported that the integration would retain 110 employees in Tel Aviv and create an additional 50 jobs.

Microsoft’s ownership of LinkedIn has further fueled suspicions of alignment with Israel, given Microsoft’s deep security partnership with the Israeli military particularly following October 2023.

Leaked documents previously revealed that Microsoft invested millions of dollars in providing Azure services used for intelligence gathering and target identification, at a time when Gaza was under intense bombardment.

In a stunning political upset, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán conceded defeat on Sunday, April 12, after preliminary official results showed the opposition TISZA party, led by Péter Magyar, taking the lead in the country’s general election.

The outcome ends 16 uninterrupted years of Orbán’s rule and closes the chapter on one of Europe’s most prominent experiments in “illiberal democracy.”

This was not merely a routine electoral loss for a seasoned leader. It marked the abrupt collapse of a governing system that had long presented itself as one of the most cohesive and durable variants of Europe’s right capable of reshaping political institutions to secure and perpetuate its hold on power.

The result raises pressing questions about Hungary’s future trajectory, particularly its relationship with the European Union and its positioning between the United States, Russia, and Israel. Orbán had widely been regarded as the closest ally within the EU to Donald Trump, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Vladimir Putin.

A Turning Point in Hungarian Politics

A first reading of the election and its broader context suggests that Hungary has experienced more than a routine democratic exercise. This was a defining political moment, underscored by record voter turnout exceeding 77 percent the highest in decades reflecting an extraordinary level of public mobilization and a widespread sense that the country stood at a crossroads.

That surge in participation, combined with the opposition’s decisive performance, signals a profound shift in public sentiment. It points to a clear erosion of confidence in Orbán’s governing model, which had dominated Hungarian political life for more than a decade and a half.

The weight of this outcome is amplified by the conditions under which the vote took place. The election unfolded in a deeply uneven political environment, marked by the ruling party’s dominance over media, institutions, and networks of influence. For many observers, the contest was structurally imbalanced from the outset.

Against that backdrop, the result reads as a sweeping protest vote an unmistakable rejection of Orbán’s rule and of his foreign policy alignment with populist regimes. It reflects the rapid erosion of the system’s legitimacy after years of centralizing power to an extent critics increasingly described as insular and monopolistic.

That trajectory was compounded by rising poverty, economic underperformance, entrenched corruption, and Hungary’s growing isolation within Europe due to its confrontational stance toward the EU.

Beyond Hungary’s borders, Orbán had evolved into more than a national leader. He became a central political and ideological figure within Europe’s populist right and a key pillar in the transnational extension of Trumpism and Netanyahu’s political model.

His fall, therefore, carries significance well beyond domestic politics. The message delivered by Hungarian voters resonates across capitals that once viewed Orbán as emblematic of the rise and durability of this political current.

Notably, Péter Magyar, the architect of this political shift, did not emerge from the ranks of traditional opposition movements. He rose from within the very system Orbán built. That insider status appears to have bolstered his credibility among voters, who saw him as a witness to the system’s inner workings someone capable of exposing its flaws and pushing for meaningful reform.

A Possible Return to Europe

Under Orbán, relations between Budapest and Brussels deteriorated into sustained tension, often centering on the most sensitive issues facing the continent most notably the war in Ukraine and sanctions on Russia.

Hungary frequently acted as the principal obstacle within the EU, serving as a de facto veto player against efforts to forge a unified European position. This posture complicated collective decision-making and weakened Europe’s ability to act decisively.

Orbán consistently opposed the EU’s approach to Ukraine, criticized support for Kyiv, and rejected sanctions on Moscow, drawing on his close relationship with Putin. This stance repeatedly constrained Brussels’ ability to take coordinated action on matters central to Europe’s strategic security.

His defeat now opens the possibility—albeit gradual—of Hungary realigning more closely with the European mainstream. Magyar’s campaign rhetoric pointed in that direction, emphasizing a renewed commitment to Europe and declaring that Hungary’s place “has always been and will remain in Europe.”

A Setback for Trumpism

Orbán’s loss represents a significant blow to the Trump-aligned current in Europe. He was not only Trump’s closest ally on the continent but also its most visible ideological extension.

The symbolic weight of this defeat is heightened by the overt support Orbán received from Washington. Trump publicly endorsed him ahead of the vote, while Vice President J.D. Vance signaled support during a recent visit to Budapest underscoring the American right’s investment in his continued rule.

From this perspective, Orbán’s defeat is seen in Washington as a symbolic setback for Trump’s global network. It marks not just the loss of an ally, but the collapse of what had long been held up as a successful European model of nationalist conservative governance one that fused populist rhetoric with long-term institutional control.

Yet this shift does not necessarily herald a rupture in U.S.-Hungarian relations. More likely, ties will evolve from a framework shaped by personal and ideological affinities into a more institutional relationship grounded in state interests.

The partnership is expected to endure, though in a recalibrated form less tied to Trumpism and more aligned with traditional transatlantic norms.

Moscow’s Shrinking Influence

Orbán was frequently described in Western media as “Putin’s man in Europe,” a reflection of both his close relationship with the Russian president and his role within the EU as a moderating force against strong action toward Moscow.

Hungary’s repeated resistance to sanctions and its reservations about European support for Ukraine often gave the impression that Budapest functioned as an informal veto against anti-Kremlin initiatives.

Over time, Hungary became a key channel through which Russia maintained influence within the EU, particularly during moments of heightened tension.

Orbán’s defeat therefore represents more than the loss of a sympathetic leader. It deprives Moscow of a crucial partner within the EU and narrows an important avenue of influence inside Europe—weakening one of the mechanisms it long used to disrupt European unity.

A Blow to Netanyahu

In recent years, Orbán had emerged as Benjamin Netanyahu’s most reliable ally in Europe. His support went beyond conventional diplomacy, positioning Hungary as one of the most consistent defenders of Israeli policy within the EU.

This alignment was evident in Orbán’s decision to join Trump’s “Peace Council” initiative on Gaza at a time when other European leaders expressed clear reservations. His stance placed Hungary at odds with broader European public opinion, which has increasingly criticized Israeli policies and voiced support for Palestinian rights.

Orbán’s backing extended into concrete actions. He hosted Netanyahu despite an International Criminal Court decision against him and supported Israel in international legal and diplomatic arenas, including at the United Nations. Under his leadership, Budapest became one of Israel’s most dependable voices in Europe.

For Netanyahu, Orbán’s defeat represents more than the loss of a political ally. It removes a key source of support within Europe at a time of growing international criticism and deprives Israel of a partner that had often helped obstruct or dilute European consensus.

What Comes Next

Magyar’s victory does not necessarily signal a wholesale transformation of Hungary’s political system. The country is unlikely to pivot abruptly toward a liberal progressive model in the traditional European sense.

Magyar himself emerges from a conservative populist background, albeit a less confrontational one than Orbán’s. Expectations of rapid change may therefore prove overstated.

Rather than a clean break, Hungary is more likely to undergo a gradual recalibration. Orbán’s legacy remains deeply embedded within state institutions and political networks, limiting the scope for immediate transformation.

Budapest may seek to rebalance its relationships with Israel, the United States, and Russia not through sharp ruptures, but through a more pragmatic and institutional approach guided by national interests rather than personal alliances.

In this evolving landscape and amid the broader setback for Trump-aligned currents in Europe there may be an opening for Arab states to reengage diplomatically and help restore balance after years in which Hungarian policy tilted in ways that undermined several Arab causes.

Leaked U.S. intelligence has revealed that China is preparing to supply Iran with new air defense systems in the coming weeks, according to three individuals familiar with recent intelligence assessments who spoke to CNN. The development raises significant questions about the trajectory of the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran.

According to these leaks, U.S. assessments suggest that Tehran may seek to exploit the current ceasefire to rebuild parts of its military infrastructure, drawing on support from key external partners. Some of these evaluations indicate that Beijing could route any potential shipments through intermediary countries in an effort to obscure their true origin and avoid political embarrassment or direct diplomatic costs.

The circulating information points specifically to shoulder-fired air defense missiles, known as MANPADS. These systems are notable not only for their timing but also for their implications. If confirmed, their introduction into Iran’s arsenal would not merely represent an incremental addition of weaponry, but rather a calculated effort to enhance deterrence capabilities.

The sensitivity of these developments is heightened by their political timing. They come ahead of a potential visit by U.S. President Donald Trump to China early next month for talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping, making the issue—if substantiated—a potentially pressing item on the agenda between the two powers.

Although a spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in Washington swiftly denied the reports, calling them inaccurate and asserting that China has not supplied weapons to any party in the conflict, the denial has not tempered the American response.

Trump issued a direct warning to Beijing, suggesting it would face consequences if the intelligence proves accurate an indication that Washington views the matter as more than a routine leak, but rather as a potential strategic threat.

This narrative does not appear in isolation. U.S. media outlets have increasingly highlighted what they describe as forms of military or logistical support provided to Iran by its allies, particularly China and Russia. This raises fundamental questions: What might drive Beijing to take such a step at this critical juncture?

And what would be the scope of a possible U.S. response? More importantly, how might such a development, if confirmed, reshape the rules of engagement and push the conflict into a more complex and dangerous phase?

An Exceptional Escalation

As of this writing, these claims remain within the realm of intelligence leaks, with no official confirmation or conclusive public evidence that China is indeed moving to arm Iran directly. However, if these assessments are later verified, they would signal that the regional and international landscape is on the brink of an exceptional escalation in the arms race one that could disrupt existing balances and reshape the conflict beyond conventional boundaries.

The transfer of air defense systems in such a manner via intermediaries and at a moment of heightened sensitivity marked by U.S. military mobilization and fragile negotiations already strained by mistrust renders these leaks too consequential to dismiss as routine information.

Their deeper political significance lies in the possibility that they place Beijing, even from behind the scenes, at the heart of the war’s equation as an active participant in its trajectory, even if it seeks to obscure its direct involvement or deny responsibility for exporting such weapons, which could ultimately be traced through intelligence channels.

The narrative gains further weight in light of remarks made days ago by the U.S. president, who stated during a press conference that an F-15 fighter jet shot down over Iran last week was hit by a “shoulder-fired, heat-seeking missile.” Tehran, for its part, claimed it used a “new” air defense system but offered no further details.

Amid this ambiguity, speculation is mounting over whether that system may have been of Chinese origin a possibility that, if confirmed, would not only add a new dimension to Iran’s military capabilities but also significantly amplify the political and military weight of these leaks.

What Are MANPADS?

MANPADS are shoulder-fired air defense systems that are relatively lightweight, allowing a single individual to carry and operate them. They are used to target aircraft and helicopters, particularly those flying at low altitudes, during takeoff or landing, or in close-range engagement environments where maneuverability is limited.

Their danger stems from two parallel factors. First, their portability and ease of concealment make them difficult to detect, track, or neutralize. Second, their effectiveness in threatening or downing aircraft especially at low altitudes creates a more complex operational reality for airspace management and complicates any potential airborne operations, including amphibious or aerial landings in sensitive areas or near strategic islands.

In response to such threats, U.S. aviation would likely need to adjust its operational patterns flying at higher altitudes, altering routes, and revising rules of engagement to reduce risk. However, such measures inevitably increase operational costs, complicate battlefield dynamics, and heighten the risk of both human and material losses. This helps explain why limiting the proliferation of these systems has long been a consistent U.S. objective.

The Third-Party Tactic

According to CNN, the proposed scenario does not involve China delivering these missiles directly to Iran, but rather through intermediary countries a method commonly referred to as the “third-party” approach. This tactic allows states to transfer sensitive shipments without overtly revealing their involvement, whether due to sanctions imposed on the recipient or a desire to avoid political and diplomatic repercussions.

This pattern is not without precedent. Western media outlets, including Reuters, have previously reported on Chinese-linked networks indirectly connected to Iranian procurement of military components and drones. Similar accusations have surfaced regarding the use of third-party mechanisms in dealings with sanctioned or internationally isolated states.

Yemen has emerged as one such arena of scrutiny. While no conclusive public evidence has confirmed direct Chinese involvement, Washington has repeatedly accused Beijing of facilitating the transfer of components later used in armed drones operated by regional proxies, including the Houthis and Hamas.

Similar dynamics have been observed in Myanmar, where China and Russia have faced accusations of providing material and military support to the ruling military council, as well as in North Korea, which frequently appears in discussions about sanctions evasion networks and indirect supply chains.

In this context, the essence of the leaks suggests that Beijing, if the reports are accurate, is not operating through overt engagement. The “third party” thus becomes not merely a logistical pathway, but a political tool one that grants China plausible deniability while enabling it to support allies or partners without bearing the full cost of direct exposure.

Not Free Support… What Does Beijing Want?

Any Chinese support for Iran particularly if conducted covertly cannot be viewed as gratuitous or detached from strategic calculations. Rather, it appears, if confirmed, to be part of a deliberate approach guided by clear objectives in a highly fluid regional moment.

Foremost among these is the erosion of U.S. influence in the Middle East by raising the cost of military, political, and economic engagement. The longer and more complex the conflict becomes, the greater the burden on Washington—whether in terms of military deployment, alliance management, or mitigating economic and security fallout.

At the same time, China appears intent on preserving Iran as a regional deterrent force, one that should not be allowed to collapse or undergo strategic dismantlement. A severely weakened Iran would likely open the door to greater American dominance in the region an outcome that does not align with Beijing’s broader strategic interests.

This consideration is further amplified by Iran’s significance within China’s economic and geopolitical calculations whether in terms of energy, regional connectivity, or its role as a key partner in safeguarding Chinese strategic interests.

Ultimately, these factors converge toward a broader objective: strengthening China’s regional and global presence. Weakening U.S. unilateral dominance while preventing the marginalization of Iran would grant Beijing greater room to expand its influence and establish itself as a decisive actor in shaping global balances.

What About the U.S. Response?

The United States is unlikely to remain passive in the face of such a development if confirmed. Washington would likely view it as an exceptional escalation requiring a multi-layered response.

The first track would likely be economic and diplomatic intensifying pressure on China and raising the cost of any involvement in supporting Iran. In this context, Trump’s threat to impose additional tariffs of up to 50% on countries supplying Tehran with weapons carries particular weight, even if it remains, for now, a political warning rather than an implemented policy.

Such pressure could extend beyond general threats to targeted sanctions on specific Chinese sectors, including banking, ports, shipping companies, and major commercial entities—a strategy Washington has employed repeatedly in similar contexts.

The second track would be operational and security-focused, involving efforts to intercept or even target suspected shipments if intelligence confirms their movement. This possibility is reinforced by recent U.S. actions against vessels linked to sanctions evasion networks, particularly the so-called “shadow fleet.”

However, this path carries significant risks. Moving from sanctions and political pressure to direct interception raises the prospect of early and potentially dangerous friction between the United States and China a scenario Washington may seek to avoid unless faced with clear and consequential evidence.

Preemptive Deterrence… What If the Leaks Are False?

Perhaps the most sensitive question is this: What if these leaks are not accurate? Why would Washington allow or even promote their circulation at such a critical moment?

In that case, the leaks cease to be mere intelligence disclosures and instead function as a political tool a form of preemptive deterrence aimed at sending a clear message to Beijing: any consideration of military support for Iran will come at a cost, and Washington is watching, exposing, and threatening consequences even before actions are taken.

From another angle, the leaks may serve to diplomatically pressure China, placing it under early international scrutiny and narrowing its room for maneuver within the gray zone between indirect support and official denial.

They may also help prepare domestic and international public opinion for a more hardline phase whether through intensified sanctions on both Iran and China, or by laying the political and media groundwork for a potential return to military operations if the ceasefire collapses.

In sum, the manner in which these leaks have surfaced, their timing, and their broader context suggest they are far from politically neutral. Even if not entirely accurate, they carry a clear strategic function advancing U.S. objectives ranging from deterrence and diplomatic pressure to shaping the conditions for possible escalation.

Wars have a way of reshaping leadership structures, creating space for the re-sorting of elites according to criteria that blend resilience with pragmatism. In such moments, some actors recede while others rise to the forefront. Within this context, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf emerges as a figure who has successfully repositioned himself within Iran’s political system, drawing on a cumulative career that spans military, administrative, and political domains.

Although his electoral bids never secured him the presidency, his ascent to the speakership of parliament during one of the most sensitive periods in Iran’s history placed him at the heart of power.

His standing was further consolidated by surviving a wave of targeted strikes against decision-making centers, elevating him into one of the most prominent figures to emerge from the transformations imposed by war.

Ghalibaf’s stature is also tied to his network within the system. He maintains familial ties to former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and a close personal relationship with the current leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, reinforcing his position within the most influential conservative circles.

This proximity has been reflected in his recent role as one of the key figures managing the regime’s public political presence amid a complex wartime environment.

Within this framework, Ghalibaf has advanced to a leading role in the negotiation track, articulating an approach that combines firmness on sovereign issues with calculated engagement in diplomacy, in line with the strategic vision set by leadership institutions.

His role has also drawn increasing international attention, as a figure capable of bridging instruments of power with the demands of politics at a time when both domestic and regional balances are being recalibrated.

Early Life and Formation

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf was born in August 1961 in the town of Torqabeh, northeast of Iran, to a Kurdish father of the Kermanch origin, Hossein Ghalibaf, and a Persian mother, Khair al-Nisa Boujmehrani, in a setting close to the city of Mashhad.

His political and social awareness took shape early, influenced by the atmosphere surrounding the 1979 Iranian Revolution. As a teenager, he regularly attended religious lectures in mosques, an experience that fostered his engagement with public affairs and facilitated his early entry into political life.

On the personal front, he married Zahra Sadat Moshir in 1982, who later played a prominent advisory role alongside him, particularly during his tenure as mayor of Tehran, where she was involved in women’s affairs. Ghalibaf was also deeply affected by the Iran-Iraq War; his brother, Hassan Ghalibaf, was killed during Operation Karbala-4 an event that left a lasting imprint on his trajectory.

Academically, he holds a master’s degree in political geography from the University of Tehran and a PhD in the same field from Tarbiat Modares University, where his dissertation examined the evolution of local governance institutions in contemporary Iran.

In addition to his academic path, Ghalibaf has a professional background in aviation and is a certified pilot on certain Airbus aircraft, adding a technical dimension to a profile that blends administrative expertise with specialized knowledge.

Military Career and Rise Within the Revolutionary Guard

Ghalibaf joined the military at the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, enlisting in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), then still in the process of consolidating itself as the regime’s primary protective force. Within a short period, he rose rapidly through the ranks, attaining the rank of general in just three years.

In 1982, he assumed command of the Imam Reza Forces, followed by leadership of the “Nasr” Forces between 1983 and 1984. He later commanded the 25th Karbala Division, a unit known for operating beyond conventional battlefronts. These early positions formed the backbone of his military experience and solidified his standing within the IRGC.

During this period, he developed a close relationship with Qassem Soleimani, then commander of the “Thar Allah” brigade and later head of the Quds Force. Their shared battlefield experience laid the foundation for a long-standing relationship that endured until Soleimani’s assassination years later.

After the war, Ghalibaf continued his service within the IRGC and obtained a military pilot’s license, further enhancing his credentials. Following the transition of IRGC leadership from Mohsen Rezaei to Yahya Rahim Safavi, he was appointed commander of the IRGC Air Force in 1996, reflecting his elevated status within the institution.

His tenure also intersected with the 1999 student protests, during which he was among 24 commanders who signed a letter to then-President Mohammad Khatami urging a firm response an episode that underscored his hardline stance on internal security issues.

From Reconstruction to Internal Security Consolidation

Ghalibaf’s career extended beyond the military sphere into executive roles with economic and security dimensions. In 1994, he was appointed head of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, the IRGC’s engineering arm. Under his leadership, the institution expanded significantly, evolving from a limited construction firm into a major economic actor within Iran.

This role was closely tied to the post-war reconstruction phase, framed within what was known as the “Jihad of Reconstruction” initiated by Ruhollah Khomeini a process that produced overlapping institutional networks blending economic and security functions, with Khatam al-Anbiya at their core.

Following the 1999 unrest, Ali Khamenei appointed him chief of Iran’s national police, succeeding General Hedayat Lotfian. In this position, he worked to modernize the force through structural and technological reforms, including the launch of the “Police 110” emergency service.

His tenure also saw measures aimed at recalibrating the relationship between security institutions and the public sphere, including the dismissal of legal cases against several newspapers.

He later transitioned into municipal governance, succeeding Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as mayor of Tehran, a position he held for twelve years. During this period, he became closely associated with the capital’s urban transformation, as well as with managing the fallout of the 2009 presidential election protests, which triggered months of widespread unrest.

Repeated Electoral Setbacks, Steady Rise

Ghalibaf ran multiple presidential campaigns, reflecting his ambition to reach the executive apex, though without success. In the 2005 election, he focused on attracting middle- and lower-income constituencies, but the race ultimately favored Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who benefited from decisive backing by Ali Khamenei.

He ran again in 2013, finishing second behind Hassan Rouhani with over six million votes, at a time when the political climate leaned toward engagement and negotiation a trajectory that culminated in the nuclear agreement with world powers.

In 2017, he adopted a different strategy, prioritizing conservative unity and withdrawing from the race to avoid splitting the vote. He made another attempt in the 2024 election, held after the death of President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash, but once again fell short.

However, Ghalibaf succeeded in consolidating his position within the political system through the legislative branch. He was elected to parliament and became its speaker in 2020 a role that represents a key lever of influence within Iran’s governance structure.

Reconfiguring Power in Wartime

On June 13, 2025, Israel launched a large-scale air campaign targeting dozens of sites inside Iran, including nuclear facilities, military bases, and senior leadership figures, under an operation dubbed “Rising Lion.” These strikes marked the beginning of what became known as the “Twelve-Day War,” opening a new phase of regional confrontation.

Within this context, Ghalibaf sought to position himself as a symbol of resilience within state institutions, framing the confrontation as an opportunity to enhance preparedness and achieve long-term strategic gains.

As the conflict escalated, a precise intelligence strike in February 2026 targeted a high-level meeting at the residence of Ali Khamenei, killing several senior political and military figures, including Khamenei himself a development that marked a turning point in the system’s structure. Ghalibaf was among the few senior figures who survived.

These developments led to a reordering of power centers within the conservative camp, amid the absence of a traditional decision-making hub and the emergence of a more fragmented leadership model. In this environment, Ghalibaf rose as a key actor, extending his role beyond the legislative sphere to become a bridge between military institutions and political and religious circles, particularly in the absence of figures such as Ali Shamkhani and Ali Larijani.

On March 1, 2026, Ghalibaf issued a sharply worded message to Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu, warning of the consequences of escalation. The message carried both external and internal dimensions projecting Iran’s stance abroad while reinforcing an image of cohesion at home.

Gradually, Ghalibaf emerged as one of the principal voices articulating Iran’s official wartime discourse, leveraging his position as parliament speaker and his institutional networks. Amid leadership shifts, he has positioned himself as a leading candidate to steer negotiation tracks tied to the future of the confrontation, bolstered by his close relationship with Mojtaba Khamenei, now the Supreme Leader.

Adaptive Pragmatism: Managing Multiple Roles

Ghalibaf’s political trajectory defies simple categorization, revealing a consistent ability to reshape his public persona in response to shifting political environments. In 2005, he presented himself as a “technocratic pilot”; by 2013, he adopted a more security-oriented profile aligned with conservative rhetoric; in 2017, he embraced a populist tone framed around the “96% versus 4%” dichotomy.

By 2024, his tone had softened, projecting the image of a pragmatic politician capable of tactical maneuvering within the system’s boundaries.

This adaptability has earned him labels such as “the man in the shadows” and “the crisis commander,” particularly in managing internal unrest and external tensions. He reinforces this image through carefully crafted symbolism, including his recurring portrayal as a pilot, often appearing in cockpits blending technical authority with leadership imagery.

Compared with figures such as Ali Larijani and Saeed Jalili, Ghalibaf stands out as a hybrid model combining rigidity with pragmatism, security expertise with political maneuverability. Some Western circles view him as a figure capable of operating both within and beyond the system, precisely because of this duality.

His tenure as police chief reflected this blend, combining strict policies toward protests with efforts to modernize the force’s structure and public image. His dual background—military and administrative—anchors his influence within the Islamic Republic as a conduit between hard power institutions and civilian governance.

Domestically, he is positioned within what might be described as the “deep state,” maintaining a firm stance toward protests and defending security institutions against what he characterizes as externally driven threats.

Despite this cohesive image, he has faced criticism tied to a family-related controversy involving Iran’s “sensitive positions” law, after reports surfaced of a relative seeking foreign residency raising questions about the gap between legislation and practice.

Internationally, Ghalibaf’s discourse reflects a dual approach: readiness for confrontation paired with conditional openness to negotiation. He emphasizes Iran’s support for the “Axis of Resistance” against Israel while keeping diplomatic channels open when strategic conditions permit. In this light, some international observers regard him as a decision-maker capable of adapting to negotiation dynamics.

From participation in global forums such as Davos to negotiation engagements in regional capitals like Islamabad, Ghalibaf appears as a multifaceted actor navigating the intersections of economics, politics, and security maintaining a central role in Iran’s relations with major powers, particularly the United States.

Ultimately, his strength lies in his ability to adapt without losing his footing within the system, drawing on a composite profile that merges military experience, executive management, and legislative authority.

Complex Negotiations: Consolidating Gains and Repositioning

Ghalibaf now leads one of the most sensitive missions within Iran, heading the negotiating delegation in talks with the United States following a costly military confrontation that has reshaped regional power balances. Iran has demonstrated its capacity for resilience and for accumulating leverage on the ground factors that directly influence its negotiating ceiling.

Tehran’s approach is anchored in a dual objective: safeguarding the system’s structure while consolidating wartime gains, particularly in strategic corridors such as the Strait of Hormuz, alongside seeking a de facto end to confrontation and an opportunity to recalibrate.

The negotiation track is thus highly complex, given the overlap of military, political, and economic dimensions. Iran aims to solidify its regional influence, break the sanctions regime, and create space for internal reordering while mindful of a negotiating legacy shaped by previous dealings with the Trump administration, which were marked by volatility and the use of diplomacy as a prelude to military escalation.

Against this backdrop, Ghalibaf understands that any durable agreement that secures Iran’s interests and translates wartime gains into political equations would significantly enhance his standing within the system and potentially position him for the highest office, drawing on a career-long accumulation of political and security capital at a moment that is redefining Iran’s leadership landscape.

At its inception, the “Global Peace Council” appeared to be an ambitious project aimed at administering Gaza and its aftermath within a new international framework one promoted as more effective than the United Nations, backed by costly membership fees and sweeping powers granted to the U.S. president.

Yet the initiative quickly lost momentum, hampered by faltering funding, institutional disarray, and a declining ability to deliver on its promises. The outbreak of war with Iran further pushed it to the margins, transforming it into a struggling entity facing serious questions about its viability and future.

This report traces the trajectory of its rise and faltering, unpacking how its financial and political crises became entangled with the war and whether it remains salvageable.

The Peace Council: 4 Stages of Rapid Decline

1. Launch and Legitimacy (January 22, 2026)

U.S. President Donald Trump launched the council in Davos in the presence of several world leaders, positioning it as the spearhead of his plan to end the Israeli assault on Gaza.

The council’s charter stipulated that any country seeking a permanent seat must pay $1 billion, while standard membership would be granted for three years.

Its founding members included Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, the UAE, and Morocco, alongside Turkey and Israel, as well as states from Central Asia and Latin America.

In contrast, major Western powers including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Canada declined to join, while China and Russia also abstained.

Critics argued that the council granted Trump unprecedented authority, with the charter empowering him to appoint permanent members, amend bylaws, and select the commander of the international stabilization force.

Although the UN Security Council adopted a resolution in November 2025 recognizing the council as a transitional administration for Gaza until 2027 and authorizing the deployment of an international stabilization force, the mandate imposed restrictions, requiring the council to submit reports every six months raising questions about its legitimacy.

Some critics went further, describing the council as a “colonial” construct, arguing that its leadership both sets policy and funds it, while Palestinians themselves are excluded from membership.

2. The Pledging Conference and the Bet on Funding (February 19, 2026)

Less than a month after its launch, the council convened its first leaders’ meeting at the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington.

Trump announced that member states had pledged $7 billion as an “initial installment,” part of broader commitments totaling $17 billion for Gaza’s reconstruction.

The United States itself pledged $10 billion subject to congressional approval while the UAE committed $1.2 billion, and Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait each pledged $1 billion.

Other countries offered non-financial contributions: Indonesia proposed sending 8,000 troops to the international stabilization force, while Egypt, Turkey, and Morocco pledged to train police forces and provide logistical support.

The United Nations estimated the total cost of rebuilding Gaza at $70 billion, yet the enthusiasm in the room suggested that the council was transitioning from a political announcement to a funded international mechanism.

Still, observers noted the absence of any Palestinian representatives and the lack of clarity about how funds would be managed and distributed.

The conference ultimately underscored an overreliance on Gulf and U.S. financing, making the plan’s success contingent on those countries’ ability to fulfill their pledges.

3. A Faltering Implementation Test (February–March 2026)

On January 14 prior to the pledging conference Trump announced the formation of the National Committee for Gaza Administration (NCAG), composed of 15 Palestinian technocrats led by Ali Shaath. Its mandate was to assume control of ministries, restore services, and disarm factions.

However, the committee remained stranded in a hotel in Cairo, as Israeli authorities denied its members entry into Gaza, while Hamas continued to administer institutions.

In parallel, the council presented Hamas with a five-phase disarmament plan spanning eight months, beginning with the transfer of security control to the national committee and ending with the withdrawal of Israeli forces after verification that Gaza was free of weapons.

The plan required dismantling Hamas’s tunnel network and consolidating heavy weapons between days 31 and 90, followed by the collection of small arms over 250 days. Hamas publicly rejected the proposal, insisting on guarantees for Gaza’s reconstruction and a full Israeli withdrawal.

Because the council failed to ensure Palestinian participation in drafting the disarmament mechanism or to provide political guarantees, its first real test deploying the Gaza administration committee and initiating disarmament effectively collapsed.

4. Funding, the Iran War, and Disappearance from the Scene (Since Late February 2026)

On February 28, the United States and Israel launched large-scale attacks on Iran, plunging the region into a new war that diverted most international attention and resources. According to informed sources, negotiations between Hamas and Tel Aviv over disarmament halted with the outbreak of hostilities.

Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi stated that all Peace Council discussions had been “suspended” due to the war, noting that Jakarta would consult Gulf partners before proceeding with its troop deployment. Indonesian religious scholars also called on the government to withdraw from the council.

These developments coincided with the council’s growing inactivity. The Associated Press reported that it had not convened again after its initial conference, and that diplomatic efforts had shifted to other fronts.

The war also affected Gulf states’ willingness to disburse funds, as their oil facilities came under Iranian attack and their leadership questioned the feasibility of financing such a project amid direct confrontation.

On April 10, Reuters revealed that the council had received less than $1 billion of the $17 billion pledged coming from just three countries: the United States, the UAE, and Morocco. Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait had yet to contribute, while other countries limited themselves to verbal commitments.

A council official acknowledged that the Iran war had affected everything, making it more difficult to secure funding and leaving the Palestinian committee unable to operate, according to Reuters.

A Palestinian member of the technocratic committee further disclosed that the council’s envoy, Nikolay Mladenov, had informed them that “no funds are currently available,” contradicting earlier statements that resources would be allocated “as needed.”

What Lies Ahead for the Council?

Amid its current paralysis, four possible scenarios emerge for the council’s future:

1. Freeze or Slow Death:
The council appears headed toward de facto suspension. No meetings have been held since February, no funds are being disbursed, and the UN mandate expires in 2027. Without funding or progress on disarmament, it may become a nominal body.

2. Restructuring or Integration:
Experts from the Carnegie Endowment have called for restructuring the council and establishing transparent oversight mechanisms before funds are committed. This would entail broader Palestinian participation, reduced presidential powers, and linking reconstruction to a clear political framework.

It may also need to operate under UN auspices or in partnership with the World Bank, whose president, Ajay Banga, has indicated a willingness to act as trustee while the council determines spending.

3. Downsizing and Absorption into Other Frameworks:
There is a possibility that the council’s functions could be absorbed into initiatives overseen by the United Nations or the Arab League, particularly if major powers agree on an alternative framework after the Iran war subsides. The lack of European support strengthens this probability.

4. Transformation into a Personal Project:
A reading of the council’s charter suggests it grants the U.S. president near-total control, including appointing members and dissolving the body. Without funding or broad international recognition, it could evolve into a political instrument for leverage or rivalry with the United Nations.

In other words, the council’s fate hinges on several factors: the full resolution of the Iran war, donor commitments, the Palestinian committee’s ability to enter Gaza, and the council’s success in addressing legal criticisms that cast doubt on its legitimacy.

At a moment when legal language seems incapable of concealing the essence of what is unfolding, the Israeli Knesset has passed a law permitting the execution of Palestinian prisoners a move that redefines the relationship between law and power and pushes it toward a sharper and more perilous trajectory.

Legislative text is no longer merely an instrument for regulating punishment; it has become a framework through which the very meaning and limits of justice are reshaped, in a context charged with politics and conflict.

Within this context, Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, in collaboration with human rights organizations and Knesset members, has filed an urgent petition before the Supreme Court in an effort to halt the law’s implementation.

These efforts are led by Suhad Bishara, Director of the Legal Department at the center, placing the issue at the heart of a legal debate that extends beyond the text itself to its implications for fundamental rights foremost among them the right to life and the right to a fair trial.

This interview seeks to unpack the dimensions and implications of the law, and to examine what it reveals about transformations within the structure of the legal system at a moment when legal considerations intersect with broader human questions.

As the petition proceeds and its outcome remains uncertain, an open legal battle is taking shape one that places this legislation under international scrutiny and ties its consequences to a broader context concerning the status of justice in a world facing mounting tests.

To what extent does the Supreme Court of Justice have real authority to overturn a law passed by the Knesset, especially if it is presented within a security framework?

Procedurally, the Supreme Court does have the authority to review the constitutionality of laws and potentially strike them down, as it is the highest judicial body in this domain. However, the exercise of this authority does not occur in a purely legal vacuum; political and security considerations often intersect with legal principles.

That said, we believe the petition rests on strong legal and constitutional foundations, reinforced by principles of international law. The law in question is exceptional, both within the domestic legal context and internationally.

Domestically, it is intended to be applied in the occupied Palestinian territories, which constitutes a dangerous precedent. We have previously seen legislation enacted to retroactively legalize certain settlements in the West Bank, only for the Court to later deem it unconstitutional and annul it.

This law represents a new attempt by the Knesset to directly impose its legislation on the West Bank and on Palestinians, raising a fundamental issue of jurisdiction. Under international law, Israel is not sovereign over the territories occupied since 1967, and therefore the Knesset lacks the authority to legislate for them.

This issue is further reinforced by the rules of international humanitarian law governing occupied territories, as well as by repeated resolutions from international bodies affirming the status of the West Bank as occupied territory and the inapplicability of Israeli law there. This constitutes one of the central grounds for challenging the law.

On the constitutional level, the law starkly contradicts the global trend rejecting the death penalty. For decades, most countries worldwide have moved toward abolition. United Nations recommendations affirm that capital punishment is inhumane and call for refraining from enacting new legislation that entrenches it.

The international human rights system, including European conventions, has solidified this direction, with most European states having fully abolished the death penalty.

Even countries that have not formally abolished it have refrained in practice from carrying out executions, rendering it effectively obsolete. In contrast, the number of countries that still implement it remains very limited, making them exceptions on the global stage.

At its core, this law constitutes a direct violation of the right to life a fundamental and absolute right that admits no derogation. This gives the law an exceptional and dangerous character, both judicially and within the broader human rights framework, strengthening the grounds for its challenge and annulment.

What is the strongest legal basis for challenging the law permitting the execution of prisoners?

The Supreme Court’s authority in this context lies in examining the constitutionality of the law under Israel’s Basic Laws, and it may ultimately determine that the law is unconstitutional. At a minimum, it could rule that the law does not apply to the occupied Palestinian territories due to the Knesset’s lack of jurisdiction.

Accordingly, several scenarios emerge: the Court could deem the law constitutional in principle but inapplicable in occupied territories; or it could rule the law entirely unconstitutional, both within Israel and in the West Bank, thereby annulling it altogether which is the desired outcome.

Does the Court have precedents in annulling or limiting laws of a similar security or punitive nature, and to what extent can these precedents be invoked?

Generally, the Court tends to refrain from intervening in decisions framed as security-related, as Israeli authorities often use this designation to advance certain policies. In such cases, the Court proceeds with caution. However, what is notable about this law is that its declared nature is not purely security-based.

This is fundamentally a criminal law. While the acts it addresses are classified under Israeli law as “terrorism,” giving it a security dimension, its core is punitive. It therefore falls outside the traditional scope of security measures in which the Court typically avoids intervention.

The Israeli legislator explicitly states that the law’s purpose is “deterrence.” Yet in our petition, we provided a thorough refutation of this claim, demonstrating that deterrence has not been substantiated neither before the Israeli legislator nor during any stage of the legislative process.

We included expert opinions and research indicating that the death penalty does not serve as an effective deterrent, whether for ordinary crimes or those driven by ideological motives.

Another fundamental flaw lies in the law’s discriminatory (apartheid-like) dimension. In practice, it applies almost exclusively to Palestinians, whether in the occupied territories or within Israel, reflecting a clear dual legal system.

This can be illustrated through three scenarios:

• A Palestinian in the West Bank convicted of premeditated killing classified as “terrorism” would be tried in a military court and could face the death penalty.

• An Israeli settler convicted of the same act under identical circumstances would not be tried in a military court, nor subjected to the same law or penalty.

• A Palestinian citizen of Israel, if convicted under the expanded definition of terrorism, could also face the death penalty under the proposed amendments.

This explicit disparity entrenches a dual legal regime based on nationality, raising serious constitutional concerns and clearly violating international law principles.

As for precedents, the Court has previously struck down laws, including the “Settlement Regulation Law,” on the basis of clear discrimination between settlers and Palestinians. This precedent is directly relevant. However, the current law is even more severe, as it directly infringes upon the right to life.

What legal scenarios are expected following the petition: annulment, suspension, or limitation of application? Which is most likely?

We are clearly seeking the full annulment of the law. At the initial stage, we requested a temporary injunction to freeze its implementation pending a final decision. The Court has not yet ruled on this request and has instead granted the Knesset and the Attorney General until the end of May to respond.

Following this, the Court may temporarily suspend the law, limit its application particularly by excluding the occupied territories or declare it entirely unconstitutional and annul it.

Does the judiciary constitute a real obstacle to implementing this law, or is its capacity limited?

Since the law does not apply retroactively, it is unlikely to have immediate direct consequences. However, we are closely monitoring developments. If there are indications of its application, we will return to the Court to seek an urgent injunction.

The judiciary remains a significant actor, but its impact depends on its willingness to intervene and the timing of such intervention.

Can European opposition to the death penalty translate into effective pressure?

Many European states have issued clear and explicit positions against the death penalty, reflecting a largely unified stance grounded in its abolition across Europe. This opposition is echoed by international institutions, including UN bodies.

These positions are undoubtedly important and exert political and moral pressure. However, whether they translate into tangible action depends on political will, diplomatic efforts, and broader regional and international dynamics.

What tools could the European Union realistically use to influence this law?

The EU possesses leverage through its bilateral agreements with Israel, which emphasize respect for democratic principles and human rights. However, there remains a gap between political statements and concrete measures, as action requires time, diplomatic effort, and internal consensus among member states.

Can international pressure influence the Court internally?

The Court does not operate in isolation. It is influenced by both domestic developments and international positions. The petition itself highlights international criticism, as the law clearly violates international legal standards.

Public opinion and international stances can therefore play a meaningful role in shaping the broader context within which the Court makes its decisions.

Do these factors collectively have real impact, or are they merely symbolic?

It is difficult to predict the final outcome. However, based on legal precedents and expert analyses particularly regarding the weakness of the deterrence argument there are real opportunities to influence the Court’s decision.

While not guaranteed, these possibilities remain significant. Ultimately, the judicial path remains the primary—and perhaps only—effective avenue to halt or overturn this law.

As a temporary ceasefire between the United States and Iran came into effect at dawn on Wednesday, April 8, the world appeared, at last, to catch its breath after a wave of escalation that had gripped both regional and international audiences with anxiety. Yet this fragile calm proved short-lived. Israel quickly shattered the atmosphere, launching a wide-ranging and deadly escalation in southern Lebanon.

In the span of just hours, it carried out one of its most intense military operations in the course of its conflict with Hezbollah, leaving more than 250 Lebanese dead and over 1,160 injured, according to official figures from Lebanon’s General Directorate of Civil Defense.

This escalation came at an exceptionally sensitive moment. Tehran backed by Pakistan had asserted that the Lebanese front fell within the scope of the de-escalation agreement. Iran, accordingly, stressed the need to uphold the agreement in full, rejecting any attempt to fragment it politically or militarily.

That position, however, soon collided with Washington’s stance. President Donald Trump denied that Lebanon was included in the agreement, amid growing speculation that he had granted Benjamin Netanyahu’s government a green light to carry out the operation.

Here, Iran finds itself facing an extraordinarily complex equation. On the one hand, it cannot abandon its support for Hezbollah, which entered the war as part of Tehran’s broader strategic support network in its confrontation with the United States and Israel.

On the other hand, Iran is acutely aware that escalating this support too far could unravel the fragile agreement with Washington, undermine the emerging diplomatic track, and plunge the region back to square one.

Between these two poles lies the central question: how can Tehran manage this delicate balance between protecting its Lebanese ally and preserving an open line of understanding with the United States?

An Early Dispute and Diverging Interpretations

Within hours of the ceasefire taking effect, a clear rift emerged among the parties over how to interpret several leaked provisions of the agreement chief among them whether Lebanon was covered by the de-escalation framework. While the Pakistani mediator emphasized that Lebanon was included, both Israel and the United States took the opposite view.

In a statement issued by the Israeli prime minister’s office, it was made clear that Lebanon was not part of the agreement and that operations against Hezbollah would continue uninterrupted. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi responded on the platform X, stating that the United States must choose between a ceasefire and continuing the war through Israel, as it could not have both. He insisted that the terms of de-escalation were clear and did include Lebanon.

Washington, however, presented a markedly different account. It maintained that the ceasefire applied solely to the conflict with Iran and did not extend to Lebanon. U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance went further, suggesting that while the Iranians believed Lebanon was included, this was not in fact the case.

He stressed that the United States had made no such commitment and warned that the Lebanese file could become a factor threatening the collapse of the understanding with Tehran.

This divergence appears to go beyond a mere misunderstanding or technical difference in reading the text. Rather, it reflects a political struggle over interpretation each party seeking to frame the agreement in a way that serves its own strategic interests. The conflicting readings do not necessarily point to a textual error so much as they reveal deliberate efforts to assign differing, even contradictory, meanings based on shifting balances of power and interest.

Accordingly, the debate over Lebanon not only raises doubts about the agreement’s coherence but also invites broader questions about its seriousness and the underlying motives behind its formulation and timing. These doubts deepen in light of other sensitive disagreements whether regarding uranium enrichment or the future of Iran’s nuclear program suggesting that what has been reached may be less a durable agreement than a temporary pause, vulnerable to collapse at the first serious test.

How Does Iran Read This Escalation?

Tehran does not view Israel’s escalation in Lebanon as a mere, containable breach of the agreement. Rather, it sees it as a deeper and more consequential move one whose timing carries political and security messages. From Iran’s perspective, Tel Aviv is attempting to impose a new equation: one that grants it additional leverage at the negotiating table while simultaneously reshaping regional balances in line with its strategic vision.

In this light, Iran interprets the escalation as a dual message. The first is directed at Tehran itself: any understanding with Iran does not constrain Israel’s military freedom in Lebanon, and any agreement with Washington does not automatically extend protection to Iran’s regional allies.

The second message is aimed at the United States, affirming that Israel retains the right to define the arenas of war and de-escalation according to its own security calculations not according to flexible diplomatic formulations or ambiguous agreements.

Accordingly, Tehran views the escalation as an Israeli attempt to exploit the U.S.–Iran ceasefire window to the fullest extent possible by intensifying pressure on Hezbollah before broader political understandings can take shape understandings that might impose greater constraints on Israel’s room for maneuver.

From this perspective, the exceptional ferocity of Wednesday’s strikes appears as a calculated effort to establish new facts on the ground before the contours of the next phase are set.

Iranian analysts also believe the escalation serves two primary objectives. First, it reinforces a strategy of separating fronts and dismantling the cohesion of the “axis of resistance.” Just as Israel previously succeeded in separating the Lebanese front from Gaza, it now seeks to detach Lebanon from the Iranian track itself thereby weakening Tehran’s ability to manage its regional leverage as a unified pressure bloc.

Second, it aims to disrupt—or gradually undermine—the agreement with the United States, driven by an Israeli conviction that the deal fails to meet its minimum strategic expectations, while others see it as a political gain for Iran and a clear shortfall in achieving Israel’s maximal goals.

Thus, Iran’s reading does not separate battlefield developments from political calculations. It views the escalation not as a limited military operation but as part of a broader struggle over the shape of future understandings, the limits of influence, and the regional balance that will emerge after this round of conflict.

Tehran Before a Complex Equation

Recent developments place Tehran squarely before a deeply fraught dilemma, caught between two equally difficult options.

The first is to scale back its support for Hezbollah or at least lower its ceiling in order to preserve the agreement with the United States, particularly in light of the heavy losses it has sustained during the conflict and the mounting military, political, and economic pressures pushing it toward avoiding another draining confrontation.

Yet this path comes at a high cost. A retreat from supporting Hezbollah could shake Iran’s image as the central leader of the “axis of resistance” and undermine its credibility among regional allies in Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq. It could also open the door to a contraction of its regional influence, placing its allies in politically precarious positions and potentially stripping Tehran of one of its most important deterrent assets.

The second option is to press ahead with supporting Hezbollah, insisting that any agreement must include de-escalation in Lebanon, while keeping open the possibility of retaliatory missile strikes against Israel. But this path carries significant risks: it would raise the cost of negotiations with Washington and could ultimately derail the diplomatic track altogether especially given the increasingly hardline tone from the United States and explicit warnings from Donald Trump that any full breach of the agreement could trigger a far more severe escalation.

Iran thus finds itself at a critical crossroads: either preserve the agreement at the expense of its regional standing, or uphold its alliance with Hezbollah at the risk of collapsing the understanding with Washington and dragging the region back to square one.

This is not merely a tactical decision or a reaction shaped by short-term calculations. It is a fundamental test of Tehran’s ability to balance the demands of influence with the imperatives of survival a test that will help define the contours of deterrence and regional equilibrium in the coming phase.

Three Possible Paths

Within this framework, Tehran appears to be attempting to craft a delicate formula: supporting the Lebanese front without triggering the collapse of its agreement with the United States. Yet this balancing act is far from straightforward, presenting Iran with three primary scenarios.

The first is a diplomatic path, centered on intensifying pressure through mediators and building international support for including Lebanon within the agreement during the two-week de-escalation window. However, this route faces significant obstacles, particularly given Benjamin Netanyahu’s determination to retain Lebanon as a crucial political and security card both in regional negotiations and for his own domestic and international positioning.

The second is a political-negotiation track, leveraging Iran’s pressure tools at the bargaining table. In this context, Tehran may invoke the Strait of Hormuz not necessarily through direct escalation, but as a strategic bargaining chip alongside intensified diplomatic efforts.

This path could also involve discussing potential concessions, such as limits on uranium enrichment, the transfer of enriched uranium abroad, or adjustments to aspects of Iran’s broader nuclear program.

In this sense, Hezbollah becomes not merely an instrument of escalation but a negotiating asset through which Iran seeks to reshape the very terms of de-escalation. For this reason, this scenario may be the most likely to gain traction with Washington if it offers a pathway to broader gains.

The third scenario is the military option the most sensitive and dangerous comprising two sub-paths. The first involves bolstering Hezbollah through logistical, military, and intelligence support, transforming the confrontation into a prolonged war of attrition that would exhaust Israel and place it under sustained pressure, potentially drawing in other Iranian-aligned actors across the region.

Yet this approach faces a critical constraint: time may not be on Tehran’s side, particularly if Israel is racing to impose facts on the ground before the agreement’s fate becomes clear.

The second sub-path is a far more extreme “Samson option,” involving freezing the agreement and resuming operations against Israel—directly or indirectly—thereby collapsing the ceasefire and reigniting escalation across the region.

While such a move might allow Iran to project steadfastness toward its allies, it would also dramatically raise the cost of confrontation with the United States and risk plunging the region back into full-scale conflict. Ultimately, this option depends on Iran’s actual capabilities, its willingness to endure a prolonged confrontation, and the tools it possesses to sustain such escalation.

In sum, Tehran now faces perhaps its most sensitive test since the start of this round of conflict: whether to preserve the cohesion of its alliance network and regional influence, or to maintain de-escalation and avoid a new wave of instability that could threaten not only its regional standing but the stability of its governing system itself.

Between these paths, the central challenge remains: how can Iran protect its image before its allies without collapsing its understanding with Washington and without pulling the region back to the brink of explosion?

Ankara has unveiled a new chapter in the regional balance of power. On Tuesday, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan signed off on the “Tayfun Block-4” missile at Roketsan facilities in the capital, Ankara, alongside the opening of new production lines. The move amounts to a political declaration cloaked in military form one that transcends technical development and ventures into redefining Turkey’s position within a rapidly shifting regional environment.

The missile, part of an advanced generation of ballistic systems, carries implications that extend beyond its operational capabilities. It is tied to an accelerated trajectory toward strengthening defense autonomy and building a more flexible and impactful deterrent capacity.

This comes at a time of heightened confrontation between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other granting the announcement added weight in an exceptionally sensitive moment.

“Tayfun Block-4” opens a broader window into the transformation of Ankara’s strategic doctrine, where military industry intertwines with political signaling, and deterrence calculations in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East are being reshaped within a more complex and competitive framework.

A Rising Trajectory

The development of the Tayfun missile reflects a gradual and deliberate transformation in Turkey’s defense industry capabilities. Its first public chapter began in 2022, with a test launch from Rize on the Black Sea, during which the missile traveled over 561 kilometers in 456 seconds.

Initially rooted in the legacy of the short-range “Bora” missile, the first iteration of Tayfun featured relatively limited specifications: approximately 6.5 meters in length and weighing around 2,300 kilograms. It demonstrated notable accuracy within roughly five meters across a range estimated between 500 and 800 kilometers, according to test results.

This trajectory accelerated markedly with the unveiling of the latest version, “Block-4,” at the International Defense Industry Fair in 2025. Roketsan presented a larger and more advanced model, measuring around 10 meters in length and weighing nearly seven tons. This increase enabled greater fuel capacity and a heavier warhead, expanding its operational reach.

While no precise official range has been disclosed, converging estimates suggest it exceeds 1,000 kilometers, with some Western analyses pointing to even longer distances. Speed stands out as a key advantage: the missile travels at over five times the speed of sound and follows a quasi-ballistic trajectory, granting flexibility in altitude and maneuverability complicating interception by conventional air defense systems.

“Tayfun Block-4” relies on a solid-fuel engine and an upgraded guidance system combining inertial navigation with satellite-based corrections. This enhances targeting accuracy and reduces the margin of error to under five meters, according to specialized estimates.

Mobile launch platforms mounted on heavy trucks allow for flexible deployment tactics rapid positioning, execution, and withdrawal reducing the likelihood of detection prior to launch.

The warhead is designed for explosive fragmentation, with potential upgrades to include penetration capabilities targeting fortified installations or maritime assets.

A comparison across different versions highlights the scale of advancement achieved in a short period. While earlier models were categorized as short-range missiles with relatively limited payload and range, the “Block-4” variant places the system in a higher operational category, with clear improvements in speed, accuracy, and trajectory flexibility. This evolution reflects a shift in the role the system can play within Turkey’s military doctrine.

In this context, “Tayfun Block-4” represents a significant milestone in Turkey’s defense manufacturing journey. The convergence of high speed, precision, and maneuverability creates a system that is difficult to counter with traditional defenses.

This development places Turkey among a limited group of countries possessing advanced missile capabilities at this level, enhancing its ability to impose more complex deterrence equations and equipping it with rapid and decisive tools in a region marked by accelerating threats and shifting balances of power.

A Limited Club

The development of hypersonic and high-speed missile systems underscores the limited number of countries that have reached this level of military technology. As of mid-2025, such capabilities remain confined to a narrow circle of major powers.

Available data indicates that Russia leads this domain with several operational models, including “Kinzhal” and “Avangard,” followed by China, which has developed comparable systems. The United States continues to pursue multiple programs within an intensifying technological race.

Beyond these powers, other countries including India, Germany, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, France, Brazil, Iran, Australia, and Canada are advancing along varying development paths, reflecting growing global interest in this class of weapons.

In this context, Iran announced in 2023 the “Fattah” missile, with a range approaching 1,400 kilometers, signaling its ambition to enter this complex field. Turkey’s entry through “Tayfun Block-4” positions it prominently within a highly sensitive competitive environment and makes it the first NATO member after the United States to test a ballistic missile with such characteristics potentially prompting a reassessment of power balances within the alliance and its surrounding region.

Multiple Messages

Turkey’s move conveys a layered set of geostrategic messages that extend beyond the immediate military dimension, reshaping Ankara’s position within its network of international and regional relationships. These signals emerge amid profound shifts in Turkey’s national security philosophy, where reliance on indigenous capabilities has moved to the forefront of political and military decision-making.

The first message is directed clearly at the United States, against the backdrop of longstanding divergences within NATO particularly over air defense systems and arms procurement.

These tensions have driven Ankara to accelerate the development of its defense industries, a point emphasized by President Erdoğan during the inauguration of Roketsan facilities, where he highlighted the sharp increase in domestic production over the past two decades.

The new missile reflects a push toward independent deterrence tools covering a wide geographic scope, underscoring Ankara’s aim to establish a more balanced partnership within the alliance based on equitable burden-sharing and decision-making.

A parallel message is directed toward Russia, within a complex relationship that blends cooperation and competition. While Ankara and Moscow remain engaged across multiple theaters from the Black Sea to broader regional issues the development of “Tayfun” signals Turkey’s determination to build an independent deterrent grounded in domestic technology.

The missile’s reliance on solid fuel and advanced guidance systems illustrates a distinct development path, offering greater operational flexibility and rapid response capability, and reinforcing Turkey’s ability to act outside external military frameworks.

Regionally, the message targets neighboring states in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, where Turkey seeks to consolidate its position as a key military actor in security and energy dynamics. Official statements suggest that developing systems like “Tayfun” is part of a broader vision to enhance defense autonomy and project influence across multiple operational theaters.

These capabilities, according to assessments, enable Ankara to extend its deterrence reach to relatively distant targets, imposing new equations in regional power balances.

A fourth message is directed inward toward NATO itself. Ankara aims to redefine its role within the alliance, shifting from a consumer to a producer of security. Erdoğan pointed to a comprehensive project to strengthen a multi-layered air defense system integrating domestic platforms with advanced detection capabilities, thereby increasing operational independence.

Within this framework, “Tayfun Block-4” forms part of a broader architecture designed to integrate defensive and offensive capabilities, enhancing Turkey’s standing within NATO as a contributor to security production rather than merely a recipient.

In this broader context, the timing of the missile’s announcement transcends its technical dimension, reflecting a deliberate use of military tools to express political positions. Ankara is leveraging its missile capabilities as an indirect diplomatic instrument to redraw the contours of its relationships with major powers and assert its presence in a volatile and highly competitive regional landscape.

President Erdoğan’s visit to Roketsan facilities carried significance beyond ceremony, signaling a clear trajectory toward expanding defense production. During the event, he announced a package of major investments, including approximately $1 billion for completed facilities and additional projects nearing $3 billion.

These facilities are expected to multiply missile system production several times over, including “Tayfun” and domestically developed air defense systems.

How Is the Balance of Deterrence Changing?

Deterrence hinges on a state’s ability to inflict damage exceeding an adversary’s tolerance, combined with speed of execution and precision. The introduction of “Tayfun Block-4” into service marks a new phase in the balance of power surrounding Turkey, particularly within the medium-range domain, long considered a sensitive equilibrium zone among regional actors.

While Israel and Iran retain long-range capabilities beyond this scope, the new Turkish missile reshapes the landscape within a radius extending to roughly 1,000 kilometers and beyond.

In the Greek case, the missile places the entirety of Greek territory including key Aegean islands within direct targeting range. This grants Ankara additional leverage in any potential escalation, whether in maritime or aerial domains.

It is likely to prompt Greece to strengthen its defense systems and deepen cooperation with European and regional partners in an effort to offset the gap created by Turkey’s advancing missile capabilities.

In the South Caucasus, “Tayfun Block-4” reconfigures the balance with Armenia, whose missile systems are limited in range compared to Turkey’s new capabilities. This provides Ankara with additional leverage in sensitive regional issues, including transport corridors and dynamics related to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It may also push Yerevan to deepen ties with its traditional allies in search of a counterbalancing deterrent.

Regarding Israel, the Turkish missile introduces a new dimension to an already complex relationship, granting Ankara the option to target strategically significant installations in the event of escalating tensions. While Israel possesses long-range missile capabilities, Turkey’s entry into this domain reinforces the notion of mutual deterrence and compels a reassessment of alliance structures and defensive deployments in the Eastern Mediterranean.

As for Iran long reliant on an extensive missile arsenal to project regional influence it now faces a more complex equation with the emergence of a Turkish system characterized by high speed and advanced precision.

This provides Ankara with the capacity for rapid and accurate response should its interests be threatened, complementing its multi-layered air defense projects and enhancing its ability to address missile threats in both defensive and offensive contexts.

A Tool of Negotiation

Beyond its role as a qualitative addition to military capabilities, the missile emerges as a tool of influence within the negotiation tracks in which Turkey is engaged across multiple fronts. When hard power reaches a certain threshold of readiness and precision, it becomes an implicit factor shaping political decision-making, granting policymakers broader room to maneuver in managing complex issues.

In this context, missile development intersects with a network of ongoing challenges, from relations with the United States and Russia to interactions with the European Union and regional actors.

In dealings with Washington, this development adds a new dimension to negotiations over arms procurement and coordination within NATO particularly regarding fighter jets and security arrangements in Syria. Possessing advanced missile capabilities strengthens Ankara’s negotiating position and reduces its dependence on a single strategic pathway.

At the same time, it introduces new calculations, including the potential for counter-pressures such as sanctions or technology transfer restrictions.

In managing relations with Moscow, deterrence tools intertwine with the complex nature of bilateral ties. Turkey, already engaged with Russia across overlapping arenas, now holds an additional card that enhances its maneuverability.

This leverage can be used to maintain a delicate balance of interests, though it requires careful management to avoid escalation that could destabilize broader regional arrangements.

Regionally, military capability intersects with influence across theaters such as Libya, Syria, Iraq, and the Eastern Mediterranean. Possessing a precise and rapid missile capability provides a deterrent umbrella for Turkey’s military presence and strengthens its position in energy disputes and maritime boundary negotiations, where economic interests are deeply intertwined with power dynamics.

In this framework, military capability becomes a shaping force in the positions of other actors, both in negotiation and crisis management.

Within this broader picture, “Tayfun Block-4” emerges as a tool redefining the relationship between power and diplomacy in Turkish policy. As Ankara seeks to expand its decision-making autonomy, it is deploying these capabilities to strengthen its position at the negotiating table, enabling it to craft its options from a more balanced footing.

The effectiveness of this leverage, however, will depend on how it is managed: used with flexibility and strategic awareness, it can yield gains; used impulsively, it risks driving the region toward more complex and volatile trajectories.

At the moment the United States and Iran announced a two-week ceasefire, it appeared that the major war one that had turned the Gulf into a theater for ballistic missiles and paralyzed the global economy was nearing its end.

In “Israel,” however, a paradox quickly emerged. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office welcomed the agreement, while clarifying that “the ceasefire does not include Lebanon.” Meanwhile, the Israeli military continued targeting the country and reissued evacuation orders for residents of southern Lebanon.

How, then, did Israel both government and opposition respond politically and in the media to the ceasefire with Iran? And why did it insist on continuing its offensive in Lebanon, despite Tehran’s assertion that the country was covered by the understandings?

Political Positions in “Israel”

1. The Government

Netanyahu’s office announced its support for Washington’s decision to halt strikes on Iran for two weeks, but stressed that the agreement “does not apply to Lebanon.” It further asserted that any ceasefire would depend on reopening the Strait of Hormuz and on Iran and its allied groups halting all attacks.

This official position reflects the government’s desire to project that the United States had accepted Israel’s conditions, and that Israel would continue confronting what it describes as the “real threat” Hezbollah, which possesses a missile arsenal capable of threatening the country’s north.

The Israeli military echoed this stance, stating that the de-escalation changes nothing in Lebanon. It renewed warnings to civilians in Beirut’s southern suburbs, urging evacuation on the grounds that “the battle in Lebanon continues, and the ceasefire does not include Lebanon.”

This rhetoric reveals the government’s broader strategy: maintaining coordination with Washington against Tehran, while focusing on Lebanon as a theater where it can compensate for what it failed to achieve in Iran.

At the same time, some ministers sought to frame the ceasefire as the culmination of military successes. In mid-March, Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar declared that “Israel has already won” the war and that Iran had become “dramatically weaker.”

Yet he acknowledged that Iran remains capable of launching long-range missiles, and that the stated objective of toppling the Iranian regime remains far from realization.

2. Opposition Parties

On the other side, the opposition seized on the ceasefire to intensify its criticism.

Opposition leader Yair Lapid described the ceasefire as “an unparalleled political disaster,” arguing that Israel “was not at the table” when the decision was made, and that Netanyahu had “failed politically and strategically, achieving none of the goals he himself set.”

Yair Golan, leader of the Democratic Party, called the truce a “severe strategic failure,” describing it as “one of the gravest setbacks Israel has experienced.”

Avigdor Lieberman, head of the Yisrael Beiteinu party, warned that the ceasefire gives the Iranian regime “an opportunity to regroup,” insisting that any agreement must include Tehran abandoning uranium enrichment, ballistic missile production, and support for armed groups.

The intensity of criticism across the political spectrum underscores the opposition’s view that suspending the war constrains Israel while leaving Iran capable of recovering.

Some right-wing Knesset members even accused U.S. President Donald Trump of “cowardice” for halting the war, while local council heads in northern Israel warned that stopping operations in Lebanon would constitute “a moral and security failure.”

For the opposition, this shift reflects the collapse of the broader strategy. If the war’s declared objectives were to disable Iran’s nuclear program, destroy its ballistic missile capabilities, and curb its regional influence, then redirecting the conflict toward Lebanon appears to be an attempt to deflect attention from Israel’s shortcomings in Iran.

The exchange of accusations between government and opposition also reflects electoral calculations. Polls suggest that the war has not boosted Netanyahu’s popularity, with support for his coalition hovering around 40 percent roughly equal to that of the opposition. This helps explain his insistence on continuing strikes in Lebanon to project an image of resolute leadership.

The War’s Outcome: A Gap Between Goals and Results

1. Declared Objectives vs. Actual Outcomes

Since the launch of the offensive against Iran in late February 2026, Netanyahu raised the bar for declared objectives: dismantling Iran’s nuclear program, destroying its ballistic missile capabilities, undermining the regime in Tehran, and disarming Hezbollah.

These goals were echoed by both government and opposition, raising public expectations. Yet the course of the war later exposed a clear gap between what was promised and what was actually achieved.

On the ground, Israel and the United States struck dozens of missile launch sites and facilities linked to Iran’s nuclear program, and killed a number of field commanders.

However, these announced military gains were offset by contrary realities—most notably Iran’s continued ability to launch missiles, indicating that its arsenal was not fully neutralized, and that its nuclear program remains intact.

In Lebanon, Hezbollah suffered significant blows but was not disarmed. The continuation of the war there, and Lebanon’s exclusion from the ceasefire, reveal that Israel has not achieved the decisive victory it had promised.

Israeli military sources have acknowledged that fully disarming Hezbollah is “an unrealistic goal,” prompting a shift toward a more limited objective: establishing a buffer zone rather than dismantling the organization.

2. Human and Economic Costs

The Israeli government announced the killing of thousands of Iranian fighters and the destruction of command centers. However, independent reports indicate that the war has resulted in more than 5,000 deaths across the region, including over 1,600 civilians in Iran and hundreds more in Lebanon.

This toll raises serious questions about the notion of “moral victory” promoted by both Tel Aviv and Washington, given that the majority of casualties have been civilians.

Economically, Israel’s Ministry of Defense estimated the cost of each day of war at between 1.5 and 1.7 billion shekels roughly $480 million to $550 million.

The Ministry of Finance, for its part, estimated that 30 days of fighting pushed the total cost to around 40 billion shekels, or $12.6 billion. Analysts cited by the Hebrew newspaper Calcalist warned that any large-scale ground operation in Lebanon would drive costs even higher.

Losses extend beyond direct military spending. Partial shutdowns of industrial zones in northern Israel have led to weekly losses estimated at 9.4 billion shekels, alongside additional billions added to the defense budget.

In sum, Israel has emerged from the current round of war with an ambiguous outcome. The ceasefire with Iran represents an implicit acknowledgment that the open-ended war failed to achieve its major objectives. Meanwhile, the insistence on keeping the Lebanese front active reflects a desire to project strength and secure tactical gains.

The opposition sees this as a double failure: accepting a ceasefire that excludes Beirut suggests the government failed to reap the benefits of confrontation with Iran, while shifting the center of gravity to Lebanon risks dragging Tel Aviv into a new quagmire.

The battlefields of the U.S.–Israeli war on Iran are no longer confined to ports, refineries, and military bases. In recent weeks, they have extended into the very heart of the Middle East’s digital infrastructure.

This shift comes at a moment when Gulf states have been rapidly transforming into hubs for massive cloud investments. Technology companies have poured billions of dollars into building and expanding data centers, turning these facilities into integral components of the region’s economic and political landscape not merely background technical infrastructure.

Key Developments on the Ground

A turning point came on March 1, when Iran launched a barrage of drones and missiles toward Gulf countries.

Amazon Web Services (AWS) announced that two of its facilities in the United Arab Emirates sustained direct hits, while a drone strike near a third facility in Bahrain caused what it described as a “material impact.”

The company said the attacks resulted in structural damage, power outages, and additional water damage caused by firefighting efforts leading to a prolonged recovery. This marks the first known instance in which a military operation has disrupted a data center belonging to a major American technology firm.

On March 23, Amazon reported that its “Bahrain region” experienced disruptions due to drone activity, adding that it was assisting customers in migrating operations to other regions.

The company did not confirm whether the facility had been directly hit but emphasized that the operational environment in the region had become unpredictable—marking a second disruption within a single month.

Then, on April 1, Bahrain’s Interior Ministry announced that civil defense teams had extinguished a fire at a company facility following what it described as an “Iranian attack.” The following day, Reuters cited Iran’s Revolutionary Guard as claiming responsibility for targeting an Amazon facility in Bahrain.

The targeting has not been limited to the Gulf. Bloomberg reported that Israel and the United States struck two data centers in Tehran during the early weeks of the war, one of which was linked to the Revolutionary Guard.

The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) noted that these strikes reveal a new logic of targeting: data centers host both civilian and military applications, including command-and-control systems and projects such as the U.S. “Project Maven,” making them dual-use assets.

It added that the Revolutionary Guard had published a list of “legitimate” targets that included Amazon, Microsoft, Google, IBM, Oracle, and Nvidia reflecting a shift in how these facilities are viewed, from commercial infrastructure to assets of direct military value.

Cloud Infrastructure in the Middle East

Today, critical cloud infrastructure in the Middle East is concentrated primarily in the Gulf particularly in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar.

According to Emirates NBD, the UAE hosts 35 data centers, followed by Saudi Arabia with 20 and Qatar with five. This underscores the prominence of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Riyadh, and Jeddah, alongside a smaller footprint in Manama and Doha.

The Gulf has become a regional hub for cloud computing thanks to abundant energy resources and capital. Yet these same facilities have grown more visible and more vulnerable—in times of war.

Within this landscape, AWS operates cloud regions in Bahrain, the UAE, and Israel. As the Associated Press explains, each region consists of multiple independent data centers designed to ensure redundancy and continuity. However, they are not immune to missile strikes or drone attacks.

Amazon launched its cloud region in Israel in 2023, while Google activated its first local cloud region there in 2022 to serve government and military clients.

This highlights how the region’s cloud infrastructure stretches from the Gulf to the eastern Mediterranean and how it is tied not only to commercial services but also to government and security contracts.

The expansion is underpinned by massive investments. Microsoft plans to invest $15.2 billion in the UAE between 2023 and 2029 and had already spent $7.3 billion by the end of 2025. In partnership with G42, it also announced plans to expand UAE data center capacity by 200 megawatts, with operations expected before the end of 2026.

Amazon, for its part, has committed more than $5.3 billion to build a new cloud region in Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, Google and Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund are working on a $10 billion project to establish a “global AI hub” in the kingdom.

Oracle continues to expand its presence in Jeddah and is opening a new region in Riyadh, while preparations are underway for the “Stargate” project in Abu Dhabi envisioned as the nucleus of a massive, multi-gigawatt data center campus.

These facilities do far more than store data. They provide the computational power needed to run artificial intelligence models, host government systems and financial infrastructure, and support startups and public institutions alike.

Yet this very role increases their vulnerability. They depend on electricity, telecommunications, and water and remain large, easily identifiable installations.

The Associated Press notes that AWS relies on redundancy across water, power, telecommunications, and internet connectivity to ensure continuity. However, its physical security measures are primarily designed to prevent intrusion not to withstand military strikes making these centers closer to critical industrial facilities than to silent “data warehouses.”

Economic and Operational Implications

The strikes have made clear that data centers are no longer merely technical components they are now critical infrastructure.

AWS and similar services underpin the digital backbone of government, financial, educational, and commercial sectors. This is why Amazon has urged customers to migrate their operations and data to other regions.

While the Associated Press warned that the loss of a single data center may be manageable, losing multiple centers within the same region could create a real capacity shortfall and trigger broader outages.

Operationally, the crisis has revealed that choosing a cloud location is no longer merely a technical or financial decision it is a strategic one tied to political and geographic stability. AWS has advised customers to back up their data and shift operations to unaffected regions.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies noted that adversaries who once targeted oil pipelines and refineries can now, in the “age of computing,” shift toward data centers, the power infrastructure that supports them, and fiber-optic chokepoints.

This shift helps explain why such facilities are increasingly treated as targets of economic and operational value on par with ports and power plants.

Economically, the strikes do not appear to be isolated incidents but rather a warning: massive investments in cloud infrastructure are now exposed to the same geopolitical risks that threaten maritime routes and energy installations.

Disabling a single data center can paralyze banks and government offices and cost institutions millions of dollars in a short time, according to Bloomberg.

Data centers in the Middle East are no longer peripheral to the economy they are part of its core equation, much like ports, refineries, and power stations.

In its broader meaning, the war reveals that the digital economy does not operate in a vacuum. It depends on energy, water, fiber optics, and security stability. When any of these links is disrupted or threatened, the applications, services, and transactions that appear “virtual” are affected as well.

What has unfolded since early March shows that modern warfare no longer targets only what moves on land or passes through sea lanes but also the systems that manage data, communications, and services above them.

Since the meeting between Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Abdulaziz aboard the USS Quincy in February 1945, in Egypt’s Great Bitter Lake, Saudi Arabia’s place in the regional order has rested on a clear equation: oil in exchange for protection. For decades, despite periods of tension and mutual leverage, this formula governed Riyadh’s relationship with Washington.

Accordingly, by virtue of its position and interests, the Kingdom has tended to favor stability over transformation, and to defend the existing balance rather than seek to reshape it. Yet that very world one that has provided its overarching security umbrella since the end of World War II now appears to be eroding rapidly.

This is not only due to the rise of new global powers such as China, but also because the United States itself no longer represents a guarantor whose reliability can be taken for granted. Meanwhile, Israel’s occupation, in its sweeping military escalation from Gaza to Iran, is pushing the entire region toward a logic of raw power rather than negotiated settlements.

At such a moment when protection itself becomes uncertain—a country like Saudi Arabia, one of the world’s largest arms importers, finds itself compelled to reconsider the very meaning of security. It must ask, albeit belatedly: can security be bought? And should the Kingdom’s security remain a service imported from abroad, or become a structure gradually built through diversification of suppliers, technology transfer, localization of industry, and the distribution of political and military reliance across multiple capitals?

This context may explain Riyadh’s push over the past two years to expand its defense network—from Washington to Seoul, Ankara, and Islamabad particularly as the ongoing Israeli-American war on Iran and the disruption of navigation and energy flows in the Gulf reveal the fragility of the old regional formula.

The United States: The Backbone of Fragile Security

The central question gains weight from the fact that Saudi Arabia has remained among the world’s top arms importers in recent years. It ranked as the second-largest importer globally between 2019 and 2023, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), before dropping to fourth place in 2020–2024, while still remaining among the top ten importers between 2021 and 2025.

At the same time, the General Authority for Military Industries announced that the localization rate of military spending reached 24.89 percent by the end of 2024. The World Defense Show 2026 also saw the announcement of 60 defense deals valued at approximately 33 billion Saudi riyals.

Here lies the core point: Saudi Arabia is not withdrawing from its partnership with the United States, but rather seeking to reduce the risks of overreliance on a single partner. On May 13, 2025, Washington announced, in a White House fact sheet, a defense cooperation package with Saudi Arabia described as involving deals with more than a dozen U.S. companies, valued at around $142 billion.

On the same day, the Saudi Press Agency reported the signing of a letter of intent to develop cooperation in ammunition, training, support services, maintenance, system upgrades, spare parts, military education, and medical services for the Saudi armed forces.

This trajectory advanced further in November 2025 with a strategic defense agreement signed by the Crown Prince and the U.S. president, according to official statements from both sides.

Yet the significance of the American track lies not only in its scale, but in the limits of trust that now shape it. Reuters reported on May 8, 2025, that the Trump administration had separated civil nuclear cooperation talks with Saudi Arabia from the normalization condition with Israel whereas the Biden administration had previously linked normalization, security guarantees, and nuclear cooperation.

With the escalation of the war on Iran and its widening repercussions, some analyses suggest potential impacts on U.S.-Saudi security relations. More likely, however, the issue is not a decline in the American position per se, but rather that Saudi Arabia now views it with greater caution and pragmatism.

According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Saudi security remains deeply anchored in its partnership with the United States in terms of armament structures, training, exercises, and supportive American military presence.

The report also downplays the likelihood of a serious defense relationship with China, as Washington would view it as conflicting with its primary defense partnership with Riyadh. Thus, rather than abandoning a decades-long relationship, Saudi Arabia is likely seeking greater clarity within it.

Turkey: A Manufacturing and Knowledge Partner, Not Just a Supplier

The Turkish track reflects a shift from simple “importing” to “conditional importing tied to localization.” While the landmark drone deal dates back to July 2023 before the region’s escalation its significance has endured because it included technology transfer and joint production, according to Reuters and statements from Baykar, rather than merely delivering ready-made systems.

On March 12, 2025, the Saudi defense minister received his Turkish counterpart in Jeddah, followed by agreements signed on July 24, 2025, with Turkish firms such as Nurol Makina, FNSS, and Aselsan. These explicitly focused on technology transfer and local manufacturing of land systems and military vehicles.

On February 5, 2026, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that there is a direction toward deepening defense cooperation with Saudi Arabia, including potential joint investment in the KAAN fighter jet project.

The implication is that Turkey fulfills a role the United States does not to the same extent: faster delivery, greater willingness to transfer industrial know-how, and relatively lower costs in certain sectors particularly drones, land systems, and electronics.

Ankara, therefore, does not appear as a substitute for Washington in Saudi calculations, but as a functional complement that expands maneuverability and ties defense procurement to a broader domestic goal of building a local industrial base.

South Korea: Sensitive Diversification in Air and Missile Defense

The South Korean track illustrates the same trend, but in a more sensitive domain: air and missile defense. On February 5, 2024, a memorandum of understanding was signed to expand defense cooperation, including a joint committee and working groups for research, development, and production.

The following day, South Korea’s Defense Ministry announced that LIG Nex1 had secured a $3.2 billion contract to export ten Cheongung M-SAM II batteries to Saudi Arabia a medium-range system capable of intercepting ballistic missiles and aircraft.

However, the current war and reports that Washington has redeployed Patriot systems from South Korea to the Middle East highlight that reliance on the American umbrella remains tied to U.S. priorities. This helps explain Riyadh’s earlier pivot toward Seoul as part of a broader effort to reduce single-source dependence.

Britain: A Secondary Western Support Layer

Britain plays a different role: a longstanding Western partner, perhaps more reliable in terms of continuity and operational integration than the United States, but not a gateway to a separate strategic shift.

In November 2024, UK Defense Secretary John Healey visited Riyadh to advance defense cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Then, on March 31, 2026, the British government announced the deployment of the Sky Sabre air defense system to Saudi Arabia, along with additional forces and equipment, to protect allies from Iranian retaliation.

London’s role here is not to compete with Washington, but to mitigate risks stemming from U.S. unpredictability. By deploying advanced air defense systems, Britain adds an additional support layer within the broader Western security architecture consistent with Saudi Arabia’s approach of redistributing dependence rather than severing ties.

France: A Strategic and Operational Partnership

France’s trajectory over the past two years appears more focused on deepening political-military partnership than on major arms deals. In December 2024, both sides signed a strategic partnership roadmap and a memorandum of understanding establishing a joint council, expanding cooperation in defense, security, training, and military capabilities.

This translated into practice when France deployed more than 50 personnel to Saudi Arabia for the SPEARS OF VICTORY 2025 exercise, alongside Rafale fighter jets and support units.

In terms of procurement, one confirmed deal was Saudi Arabia’s July 2024 contract with Airbus Defence and Space for four additional A330 MRTT aircraft. However, this is better understood as part of a broader European track rather than a purely French one.

For Riyadh, France matters not only as a defense partner, but as a political-security actor particularly in coordination over Lebanon and joint support for the two-state solution. Paris provides both operational cooperation and a European platform for addressing regional security issues.

Pakistan: From Historic Ties to Elevated Deterrence

Pakistan represents the most controversial link. On September 17, 2025, the two countries signed a mutual strategic defense agreement stipulating that an attack on one would be considered an attack on both.

Many analysts interpret this as a major shift, given Pakistan’s status as the only nuclear-armed Muslim state. However, there is no official indication of a direct nuclear guarantee.

Still, some see the agreement as signaling that Saudi deterrence is no longer solely anchored in Washington, but may also rest on deeper military ties with Islamabad. As one Chatham House researcher put it, the deal opens a precedent toward “extended deterrence,” while Reuters suggested it implicitly introduces Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities into the regional security equation.

Ukraine: Combat Experience as Strategic Capital

On March 27, 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced a defense cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia, focusing on future contracts, technological collaboration, and air defense.

Ukraine also dispatched over 220 military experts to Middle Eastern countries, including Saudi Arabia, where they provided briefings on protecting energy infrastructure and countering asymmetric aerial threats.

In this sense, Ukraine is not entering Saudi calculations as a traditional arms supplier, but as a source of battlefield-tested expertise particularly relevant in countering drone threats.

Conclusion: Reducing Vulnerability, Not Abandoning Alliances

It remains too early to draw definitive conclusions about regional alignments. What was expected to be a swift and decisive war has instead unsettled calculations across the region and beyond, exposing the fragility of arrangements once considered stable.

Against this backdrop, Saudi Arabia’s moves are better understood not as a shift from one camp to another, nor as a break from the American umbrella, but as an effort to construct a more layered and complex security architecture. This involves maintaining the U.S. partnership while expanding cooperation with other powers and placing greater emphasis on defense localization.

The goal is not full independence, but reduced vulnerability broadening strategic options in a region where old guarantees no longer suffice.

At a moment when tensions had reached their peak, the world watched closely as the final hours ticked down on the deadline set by U.S. President Donald Trump ahead of a sweeping joint American-Israeli attack targeting Iran’s energy facilities and critical infrastructure. Tehran, for its part, had threatened a reciprocal response aimed at Israeli energy installations and U.S.-linked interests across the Middle East.

All parties understood that escalation to such a level of strikes would open a trajectory difficult to contain, pushing the region into a profoundly unstable phase whose repercussions would extend well beyond its borders particularly as energy had become a lever of pressure with direct implications for global markets and vital supply routes.

At this critical juncture, the two-week window emerged as an opportunity to contain the escalation, with proposals for a ceasefire and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz serving as an entry point to recalibrate the situation. These signals helped slow the slide toward a broader confrontation, within the context of a war the United States—alongside Israel—had steered forward as part of calculations tied to reshaping regional balances.

Against a backdrop of political declarations that allow each side to frame the outcome as an achievement, competing narratives quickly surfaced. Pakistan’s role in announcing the understanding stood out, while U.S. and Iranian statements offered contrasting indications of success. Israel, meanwhile, adopted a more cautious tone, as a temporary negotiation track was launched its ultimate trajectory still open to multiple possibilities.

What happened?

Just before the deadline, President Donald Trump announced that a ceasefire understanding had been reached with Iran, involving a two-week suspension of mutual military operations as a prelude to continued negotiations aimed at securing a longer-term agreement.

He noted that Washington had received a 10-point Iranian proposal that could serve as a negotiable framework, indicating that most points of contention had been overcome and that U.S. military objectives had been achieved. In parallel, U.S. sources confirmed the halt in military operations, linking the agreement’s implementation to the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.

Tehran, for its part, declared through its Supreme National Security Council and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi that final negotiations would be held in the Pakistani capital, Islamabad. It presented a framework that included sanctions relief, the release of frozen assets, the continuation of uranium enrichment, and specific arrangements for the Strait of Hormuz to allow safe passage for two weeks in coordination with Iranian forces.

Iran also tied its cessation of operations to a halt in attacks against it, framing the outcome as progress in imposing its negotiating terms.

Regionally, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced an agreement encompassing a ceasefire “everywhere,” including Lebanon, with Pakistan set to host direct talks between the parties within days. By contrast, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office stated that the truce did not extend to Lebanon, while supporting a two-week pause in attacks.

At the same time, U.S. leaks suggested Israel had agreed to suspend its airstrikes in parallel with negotiations, committing to the agreement in coordination with Washington.

This divergence in Israel’s position reflects a degree of duality: a formal commitment to a temporary truce alongside a more cautious political and security discourse. The gap between the negotiation track and Israel’s vision of how the war should end suggests that Tel Aviv seeks to preserve room for maneuver keeping escalation options on the table while tactically engaging in de-escalation.

Who stepped back?

Negotiations in conflicts of relative parity tend to take on a reciprocal character, with each side seeking to leverage its available cards within the limits of maneuver in order to reach an outcome closer to its interests and constraints.

Within this framework, mediation led by Pakistan and Egypt created a tangible channel of communication, helping establish a preliminary basis for discussion as the region approached a critical moment that could have triggered a wide-scale confrontation amid threats to target Iran’s energy facilities and vital infrastructure, and the prospect of a far-reaching Iranian response.

At the same time, President Donald Trump appeared to be searching for an exit from an escalating trajectory that had begun to exceed initial assumptions built on the premise of a swift resolution.

Those assumptions rested on the belief that military force and firepower alongside Israel could produce a breakthrough within Iran’s political structure, whether by fueling internal unrest or prompting shifts from within the system itself.

Yet the course of the confrontation revealed a gap between prior estimates and battlefield realities, reinforced by leaks tied to assessments by U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, as well as Israeli evaluations that had banked on internal Iranian dynamics that ultimately failed to materialize as expected.

Within this context, Iran demonstrated an ability to absorb the initial blow and rapidly adapt to the trajectory of the confrontation transitioning toward a more prepared mode of war management. Its capacity to influence global energy markets also raised the cost of confrontation at both regional and international levels, contributing to a shift in U.S. debate toward more flexible approaches.

In light of this, the move toward a ceasefire based on Iran’s 10-point proposal represents a significant step in establishing that framework as a reference point for negotiations particularly as its contents imply a redefinition of the equation in ways that run counter to U.S.-Israeli war objectives. Still, these points remain an open negotiating framework, likely to be subject to reciprocal trade-offs during the anticipated talks in Islamabad.

At the same time, Iran’s acceptance of a temporary truce marks a shift from its earlier insistence on a comprehensive and extended ceasefire with clear guarantees. This adjustment reflects a pragmatic engagement in a phased negotiation process, coupled with an effort to preserve and manage the gains achieved thus far within an open-ended diplomatic track.

What does reopening the Strait of Hormuz mean?

Throughout the war, Iran’s position linked reopening the Strait of Hormuz to a comprehensive halt in military operations, viewing pressure on energy markets as a cumulative tool requiring sustained disruption to become a decisive factor in the balance of power.

In this context, U.S. insistence on reopening the strait became a direct pressure point, which Pakistani mediation helped translate into a compromise formula as the confrontation edged toward a more dangerous phase.

Iran’s acceptance of reopening the strait thus marks a shift in how it deploys this leverage while maintaining conditions governing transit. These include coordination with Iranian armed forces and adherence to what were described as “technical considerations,” suggesting a gradual and regulated reopening that preserves Tehran’s influence over movement through one of the world’s most critical energy corridors.

The real test of this arrangement will lie in Iran’s ability to translate initial understandings including those linked to a joint protocol with Oman into a stable and implementable framework for maritime traffic.

The strait has, in effect, become a central arena of confrontation and competition over control: Iran seeks to entrench it as a strategic lever reinforcing its economic and political position, while the United States explores mechanisms to constrain that influence whether by internationalizing its management or ensuring a direct role in regulating its operations.

Temporary calm or a path to ending the war?

From a cautious perspective, the current calm appears more transitional than a definitive end to the war, particularly given ongoing disagreements over the scope of de-escalation especially regarding the Lebanese front and its linkage to the confrontation with Iran.

This remains one of the most sensitive issues, tied to a core objective of the war: reshaping Iran’s relationship with its regional allies.

In this light, the lull may be used to reorganize the military landscape, addressing deficiencies exposed during the fighting whether in munitions, air defense systems, or damage to strategic radar infrastructure. Some assessments also point to U.S. efforts to rebuild operational readiness in preparation for a potentially more escalatory phase, possibly targeting higher-value objectives.

Beyond the military dimension, Iran’s internal dynamics also factor into the equation. Some analyses suggest the current phase could be used to reignite internal pressure following the cohesion displayed during the conflict. Meanwhile, a projected improvement in energy markets may offer greater room to recalibrate economic costs before any renewed escalation.

Accordingly, the current calm remains governed by fragile considerations, in the absence of firm guarantees and amid overlapping military and political calculations rendering it closer to a truce atop volatile ground, shaped by delicate balances that could shift with any change in the parties’ assessments or priorities.

The Gulf position and the limits of its influence

Amid the escalation, Gulf states emerged as among the most exposed to the fallout of the confrontation, given their position at the heart of regional balances and their direct linkage to global energy markets and economic stability.

These developments have put the relative stability that has prevailed since the end of the Gulf War to a real test, particularly in light of risks to the investment climate and the Gulf’s image as a comparatively safe environment.

The Gulf position has been marked by clear divergences: some approaches viewed the war as an opportunity to curb Iranian influence and weaken its regional presence, while others favored preserving a level of tacit understanding that had governed relations with Tehran in recent years.

As strikes expanded to include U.S. bases and economic and commercial facilities within some Gulf states, sensitivities deepened, shifting these countries from indirect stakeholders to direct recipients of battlefield repercussions.

In this context, Gulf concerns have centered on the risk of targeting energy infrastructure especially amid threats of expanding strikes to oil and water facilities posing an open strategic challenge to their stability.

These considerations have driven efforts to intensify pressure toward containing escalation and advancing a de-escalation formula that reduces the pace of reciprocal strikes within their geographic sphere.

Accordingly, the Gulf role can be seen as a contributing factor in pushing toward de-escalation, particularly in light of challenges exposed by the confrontation regarding defense system effectiveness and vulnerability to attacks.

These developments may also prompt broader reviews of defense strategies, the nature of ties with the United States, and approaches to Iran especially in light of shifts within its decision-making structure during the war.

Two weeks of brinkmanship

After roughly forty days of the region’s most expansive confrontation, the Middle East and the world enters a phase of partial calm, even as Israeli military operations continue in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. Attention now turns to what may be among the most complex rounds of negotiations, amid a widening gap between the U.S. objectives that launched the war and Iran’s 10-point proposal that underpins the temporary truce.

Iran’s demands at this stage set a higher negotiating ceiling than those on the table before the war, placing U.S. decision-makers before difficult choices: pursuing a political settlement under new terms or re-entering a cycle of escalation.

Any Iranian success in securing parts of these demands would consolidate its negotiating position and bolster its regional standing, with significant implications for power balances and the war’s original objectives.

Within this framework, the negotiation track reflects a state of cautious anticipation, where calculations of gain and loss intersect for all parties amid a rapidly shifting regional environment.

The developments of this phase suggest that what follows this war will differ markedly from what preceded it both in terms of Middle Eastern power equations and the dynamics shaping the international system.

Less than two hours before the deadline set by U.S. President Donald Trump for Tehran scheduled to expire at 8:00 p.m. on Tuesday, April 7 (U.S. time) to strike a deal or reopen the Strait of Hormuz to avoid what he described as the “destruction of Iran’s infrastructure and its return to the Stone Age,” Trump unexpectedly announced a two-week ceasefire.

The truce is contingent upon Iran’s full, immediate, and secure reopening of the strait, following talks Washington conducted with the Pakistani side.

Iran’s response was swift. Both the Foreign Ministry and the Supreme National Security Council signaled preliminary approval, despite lingering differences over Tehran’s ten-point proposal, which Trump described as a “practical basis” for further negotiations.

Despite regional and international relief at the last-minute agreement after unprecedented escalation and hours of anxious anticipation, particularly across the Middle East, over fears of catastrophic scenarios should Washington and Tehran follow through on their threats the situation remains far from stable.

Ambiguities surrounding the deal’s details and growing doubts about its durability in the face of looming challenges continue to cloud the outlook.

Details of the Agreement

According to Trump, the United States received Iran’s ten-point proposal via Pakistani mediation, calling it a workable foundation for negotiation, though he did not disclose its full contents. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi shed some light on the proposal, stating that Tehran is prepared to halt military operations if attacks against it cease, while allowing safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz for two weeks, coordinated with Iranian armed forces.

A statement from Iran’s Supreme National Security Council outlined broader dimensions of the proposal, extending beyond immediate de-escalation to include sweeping political and security conditions. These include a commitment not to attack Lebanon, recognition of Iran’s continued control over the Strait of Hormuz, the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from regional bases, and the establishment of a secure navigation protocol for the strait.

Tehran also demands full compensation based on its own assessments, the lifting of all primary and secondary sanctions, the annulment of resolutions issued by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UN Security Council, the release of frozen Iranian assets abroad, and a halt to conflicts across all fronts, including Lebanon. These provisions, Iran insists, should be enshrined in a binding UN Security Council resolution.

Pakistan’s prime minister, Shehbaz Sharif, confirmed that both sides agreed to an immediate ceasefire not only between Iran and the United States, but also among their respective allies across multiple theaters, including Lebanon and beyond. He added that delegations from both countries are set to meet on April 10 to continue negotiations toward a comprehensive agreement covering all conflict zones.

Regional and International Reactions

The ceasefire has drawn widespread international support, reflecting a growing awareness of the risks posed by continued escalation not only for the parties involved, but also for regional security and global economic stability.

France and Germany welcomed the move, while the office of British Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced plans to travel to the Middle East for talks with Gulf partners to ensure the permanent reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.

In Southeast Asia, Indonesia praised the step, urging all parties to respect sovereignty and pursue diplomacy. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese reaffirmed his country’s commitment to working with international partners to support safe navigation through the strait.

Japan echoed similar sentiments, emphasizing continued diplomatic engagement, while Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim called for a lasting peace, arguing that Iran’s ten-point proposal should evolve into a comprehensive agreement extending beyond Iran to include Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen.

In the Arab world, Egypt welcomed the ceasefire as a positive step toward de-escalation and safeguarding regional and global stability. Iraq’s Foreign Ministry urged building on this development through sustained dialogue addressing the root causes of conflict.

At the international level, UN Secretary-General António Guterres welcomed the two-week truce, urging all parties to treat it as an opportunity for a longer-term peace in the Middle East, rather than a temporary pause in a volatile crisis.

Lebanon: The Central Fault Line

Lebanon has emerged as the most contentious front in the agreement, exposing early ambiguities regarding its scope and implementation. While Pakistan’s prime minister indicated that the ceasefire includes halting Israeli operations in Lebanon and other arenas, the office of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu swiftly denied this, asserting that the deal does not extend to Lebanon.

In an apparent effort to align the agreement with Israeli interests, Netanyahu’s office stated that Israel supports Trump’s decision to suspend attacks for two weeks but under specific conditions, foremost among them Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz and adhering to the ceasefire.

The statement also reaffirmed Israel’s support for U.S. efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons or becoming a threat through missiles or what it described as “terrorism.”

This stark divergence between the Pakistani narrative and the Israeli position underscores the agreement’s fragility. The absence of a unified interpretation particularly regarding geographic scope and obligations makes Lebanon a likely testing ground for the ceasefire’s resilience.

Domestically, Netanyahu faces pressure not to relinquish leverage in southern Lebanon, a key strategic card both politically and militarily. Early signs suggest potential escalation, even as Lebanon exercises restraint, awaiting clarity on whether it is included in the truce.

With Tehran insisting on the principle of “unity of fronts,” demanding Lebanon’s inclusion in any comprehensive deal, and Netanyahu determined to retain it as leverage, the situation grows increasingly complex. The trajectory remains uncertain ranging from early collapse to renegotiation shaped by shifting power dynamics.

What Are the Challenges?

This agreement cannot yet be considered a final or stable settlement. At its core, it resembles a temporary goodwill initiative rather than a binding framework supported by formal decisions or finalized drafts. As such, it faces a wide array of unresolved political and security challenges.

The first major point of contention lies in how the ceasefire itself is defined. Washington views it as a rapid mechanism to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and stabilize global energy markets, while Tehran seeks to embed it within a broader process leading to a comprehensive and lasting ceasefire. Trump appears to treat it as an immediate test of intentions, whereas Iran sees it as a gateway to a larger deal.

A second challenge concerns the Strait of Hormuz not only its reopening but also its future governance. Tehran reportedly seeks a role in regulating passage and potentially transforming the strait into a revenue-generating economic corridor in partnership with Oman.

However, this vision clashes with existing international legal frameworks, raising questions about whether Washington and global powers would accept such an arrangement.

The agreement also suffers from notable ambiguity on critical issues, particularly Iran’s nuclear program and enrichment activities, as well as the lifting of sanctions and the strategic trade-offs involved. While Trump described the Iranian proposal as a “practical basis,” Washington has yet to articulate a definitive position leaving room for future disputes.

Compounding these challenges is the deep erosion of trust between the two sides. Past experiences have fostered mutual suspicion, with each side wary that the other may use the ceasefire to regroup, buy time, or strengthen its negotiating position. This profound distrust makes implementation far more difficult than mere political agreement.

Perhaps the most sensitive challenge lies in Israel’s stance. Within Israel, voices are growing that view the agreement as a sign of retreat or even political defeat, placing Netanyahu under intense pressure. This could prompt attempts to derail the process whether by continuing operations in Lebanon or targeting Iran directly or indirectly.

Finally, the absence of strong, binding guarantees raises serious concerns about the ceasefire’s durability. While Islamabad supported by parallel efforts from Istanbul and Cairo has helped bridge gaps between Washington and Tehran, Pakistan alone lacks the capacity to guarantee an agreement of this scale and complexity.

It is too early to deliver a definitive assessment of this agreement or treat it as a turning point in the conflict. What has emerged thus far appears to be a necessary pause a moment to catch breath after mounting costs pushed all sides away from the brink.

Yet this ceasefire remains fragile, closer to a tentative gesture of goodwill than a durable settlement. The real challenge lies not only in sustaining the truce, but in transforming it from a military necessity into a lasting political agreement a daunting task amid deep mistrust.

Statements from Iran’s Supreme National Security Council warning that “fingers remain on the trigger, and any mistake by the enemy will be met with full force” alongside continued operations against some Gulf targets, underscore Tehran’s skepticism. For Iran, the ceasefire is merely a test of intentions.

As such, the agreement’s future hangs in the balance between a rare opportunity to contain escalation and the ever-present risk of collapse at the first serious test on the ground.

For six years, Zainab al-Mohammad has been undergoing treatment for leukemia. Yet despite the inherent hardship of her illness, the experience has grown increasingly difficult amid the irregular availability of medication, forcing her in recent months to purchase it at her own expense more often than not.

Like Zainab, cancer patients across Syria are grappling with mounting challenges in securing treatment. A shortage of essential drugs has escalated from a medical concern into a full-blown emergency within a healthcare system already strained by weakened infrastructure, a lack of basic equipment, and mounting pressure on the few operational centers.

Costly and Scarce Treatment

Zainab’s ordeal began seven years ago. A native of Damascus, she was diagnosed with chronic myeloid leukemia after doctors observed significant enlargement of both her liver and spleen particularly the latter, which had swollen to nearly three times its normal size. A treatment plan was outlined during the first year, though it did not begin immediately.

Speaking to Noon Post, Zainab—who receives care at Al-Biruni Hospital—recalled suffering from persistent fever. Initially, she believed she might be pregnant. However, after undergoing multiple tests, including blood smears and two bone marrow biopsies, she was diagnosed with leukemia, marking the start of her chemotherapy journey.

Unable to receive intravenous treatment, she instead relied on oral medication. In the past, she explained, the drug was intermittently available sometimes disappearing for one or two months, with the longest interruption lasting three months before supplies resumed.

But the situation has deteriorated significantly since the fall of the former regime. Since then, she has received the medication from the hospital only once, forcing her to purchase it independently the rest of the time. Its cost ranging between 800,000 and 850,000 Syrian pounds (depending on exchange rates) has made it prohibitively expensive.

Zainab added that she is often unable to afford the medication and has turned to numerous charities for assistance. Most, however, have been unable to help, leaving her without a consistent source of support for either treatment or necessary medical tests.

The financial burden extends beyond medication. The PCR test required every six months is particularly expensive and must be paid for out of pocket due to the high cost of materials and their unavailability in hospitals. Meanwhile, the monthly complete blood count (CBC) test is available at the hospital at a cost of around 35,000 Syrian pounds.

Even so, PCR tests remain entirely patient-funded, and the medication remains both costly and scarce. Zainab noted that she has been purchasing it herself for over a year. While shortages existed before the country’s “liberation,” obtaining the drug was never this difficult, she said.

A Long-Standing, Escalating Crisis

On a broader level, Syria’s cancer drug shortage is not new, though it became particularly visible in March 2025 when the Ministry of Health through Zuhair Qarat, Director of Planning and International Cooperation appealed to the international community for support.

At a press conference, Qarat confirmed that Syria is facing a severe shortage of oncology medications, describing the situation as both a health and humanitarian crisis affecting one of the most vulnerable segments of society.

He called on the United Nations, the World Health Organization, UNICEF, EU humanitarian funds, allied nations, and international NGOs to provide the necessary pharmaceutical support to sustain cancer treatment, stressing the need to ease international restrictions that hinder the import of medicines.

For his part, Jamil al-Dabl, head of the National Advisory Committee for Blood and Oncology, stated that the Ministry of Health currently has only 20 percent of the actual required supply for certain cancer drugs, while stocks for other types have been completely depleted warning of a looming health catastrophe affecting both children and adults.

The crisis stems from a complex web of factors, including economic sanctions, deteriorating living conditions, political and military upheavals over more than a decade, damage to the healthcare system, difficulty in securing medications, and hospitals’ limited capacity to deliver essential services.

These conditions leave patients facing stark choices: discontinue treatment due to lack of medication or resort to less effective alternatives both of which can lead to worsening health outcomes and rising mortality rates.

Beyond Drug Shortages

The cancer crisis in Syria extends beyond medication shortages, reflecting broader systemic weaknesses in oncology care. This is underscored in a report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), conducted under its imPACT Review program in collaboration with the World Health Organization and the International Agency for Research on Cancer.

The report highlights the extensive damage inflicted on Syria’s cancer care system by years of conflict, resulting in diminished capacity to provide comprehensive diagnostic and treatment services.

It notes that inconsistent access to medication disrupts chemotherapy schedules and prevents some patients from completing treatment protocols. Significant regional disparities in access further undermine patients’ chances of recovery and survival.

Additionally, the report points to shortages in equipment, laboratories, and medical technologies, alongside deficiencies in diagnostic tools, radiotherapy, and nuclear medicine capabilities. A lack of specialized oncology and radiotherapy personnel further strains the limited number of functioning centers, leading to delays and uneven quality of care.

The report warns that cancer incidence and mortality rates are likely to rise between 2020 and 2030, driven by weak early detection programs and the frequent diagnosis of cases at advanced stages making treatment more difficult and increasing reliance on medication.

It also highlights deficiencies in cancer registries, national data collection, and evidence-based planning, complicating efforts to accurately assess the scale of the crisis or develop effective policies to address it.

Although the last comprehensive assessment of Syria’s cancer care system dates back to 2021, updates from the IAEA in 2024 and 2025 indicate that the same challenges persist, with growing emphasis on improving diagnostics and treatment through initiatives such as “Rays of Hope.”

While the IAEA has announced expanded cooperation with Syria to support cancer care and equip hospitals with training and equipment, local hospitals continue to face daily shortages of even the most basic treatment necessities from medication to advanced diagnostic tools.

This disconnect between international plans and on-the-ground realities creates a clear gap in oncology care, where patients’ access to treatment depends more on the availability of drugs and resources than on stable treatment protocols.

Grassroots Efforts to Fill the Gap

Amid this landscape, grassroots initiatives have emerged to bridge part of the gap. Among them is the “Friends of Cancer Patients – Syria” campaign, which notes that current assistance is largely limited to modest financial support due to the high cost of treatment and the difficulty of covering all cases.

Munif Abazid, the campaign’s communications and survey officer, told Noon Post that cancer treatment can require doses costing thousands of dollars, making any expansion of aid dependent on substantial funding beyond current capabilities.

He explained that a specialized medical committee within the campaign prioritizes the most urgent cases to ensure fair distribution of assistance particularly given that some patients receive partial coverage from other organizations while others receive none, creating disparities in access to treatment.

Abazid identified funding as the campaign’s greatest challenge, noting that adequate resources would allow for the import of medications from abroad when unavailable locally—an urgent need given the acute shortages of certain drugs despite partial provision by official bodies.

He linked the campaign’s emergence directly to the crisis, as some patients have been forced to purchase treatment themselves, while others manage to secure support through institutions or organizations such as SAMS.

He also pointed to alternative coping mechanisms adopted by patients, including reliance on informal networks to obtain medication or the exchange of drugs among patients and the families of deceased or recovered individuals an indication of the immense strain on the healthcare system and the ongoing nature of the crisis.

Between limited grassroots campaigns and repeated official appeals for support, the suffering of cancer patients in Syria remains suspended, awaiting urgent solutions to the drug shortage sustained by a fragile hope that their voices will be heard and that their treatment can continue before their conditions deteriorate further.